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In a recent article in the American Political Science Review, we
attempted to test what we call “distributive conflict” models of
regime change using a qualitative data set of transitions to and
from democracy from 1980 through 2000. 1 These models, pioneered
by Carles Boix (2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006) 2 rest on complex
causal chains including both structural and game-theoretic components: inequality,
strategic interactions between incumbents and oppositions over the nature of political
institutions, and the ever-present threat of repression from above and violence from below.

2 Democracy, Public Policy, and
Inequality
Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu,
Pascual Restrepo and James A.
Robinson

1. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of
Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review 106 (August 2012): 495–516; Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, and
Terence K. Teo, Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset, 1980-2008, 2012.

3 Inequality, Democratization, and
Democratic Consolidation
Christian Houle

2. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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O bituary for
J uan L inz

With the sad news of Professor
Juan Linz passing away on
Tuesday, October 1, 2013, we
felt no need to issue an editor’s
note in this issue. We instead
asked Professor Linz’s disciples
and friends Jeff Miley and
Alfred Stepan to write an
obituary. There is poetry and
meaning in that this obituary
is being written by one of his
first, and one of his last PhD
candidates, both of whom
learned from him to his final
days, and like all his students,

(continued on page 3)

R ethinking I nequalit y and D emocratization : H ow
I nequalit y D ivides E lites and U nderpins R egime
C hange
Ben Ansell, Oxford University
David Samuels, University of Minnesota

Despite the implications of Przeworski et al.1, the search for factors that might
drive “endogenous” democratization is alive and well. However, scholarship on
the political consequences of economic change has shifted from the hypothesized
impact of economic growth to the question of the political consequences of
different patterns of equal or unequal growth. We owe this ‘redistributivist’ turn - which draws
attention to a purported tension between democracy and property - to the influence of Daron
Acemoglu and James Robinson and Carles Boix.2 These studies vary in how they formalize the
1. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
2. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review 91 (September
2001): 938–963; Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2003).

(continued on page 8)
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RMD s

Carles Boix, Princeton University
Redistributive models of democracy (RMD), to use Haggard and Kaufman’s expression, have been criticized on several counts: (1)
their empirical performance is weak; (2) they make unconditional predictions about the relationship between structural variables
(inequality, asset specificity, organizational and information parameters) and political transitions; and (3) the parameters of the
models are either too narrow and stylized or simply wrong – particularly (a) the assumption of rational, self-interested actors
motivated by material interests, (b) the definition of ‘classes’, (c) the sequence of the political decision process, and (d) the tax setting model.
After examining these critiques briefly here, I conclude that, broadly speaking, the idea of democracy as an equilibrium (given by the material
payoffs of relevant social and economic actors) is: (1) relatively robust and (2) the best point of departure (or, in Lakatos’ terms, a core) from
which to progressively build a satisfactory theory of political transitions.
Empirical Performance of the Theory
Several important empirical tests on RMD find that the association between economic inequality, asset specificity and political
transitions either does not exist, is highly unstable or is restricted to democratic breakdowns. Houle (2009) concludes that inequality
makes democratic breakdowns more likely but does not affect democratic transitions after 1960. Ansell and Samuels (2010) find
that land inequality explains democratic transitions since the mid-19th century but that income inequality has the opposite effect.
Haggard and Kaufman (2012) claim that almost half of all political transitions since 1980 are unrelated to distributive conflict.
As I have insisted elsewhere,1 the examination of the covariates of political transitions has to be systematic to the point of including all the
1. Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does not Affect Democratization,” World Politics 61 (October 2009): 589-622;
Ben Ansell and David Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (December 2010): 1543-1574; Stephan
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review 106

(continued on page 12)

D emocracy , P ublic P olicy

and

I nequalit y

Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Suresh Naidu, Columbia University
Pascual Restrepo, Universidad de los Andes
James A. Robinson, Harvard University

The relationship between inequality and democracy has been theorized since at least Aristotle,
but in the last decade it has been subject to intense theoretical and empirical investigation.
The first formal models of democratic transitions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001)
suggested that there would be an inverse U-shaped relationship between inequality and
democratization. Autocracies that were too equal would not democratize because there would not be enough social conflict to create an
effective demand for changes in political institutions.Autocracies that were too unequal would not democratize either because democratization
would be very costly for non-democratic elites who would attempt to stay in power via repression. These models also predicted that
democratization itself ought to reduce inequality as the newly enfranchised would vote for redistribution and more active government policy.
These theoretical results were obviously conditional on key modeling decisions. For one, political conflict was conceived of as rich/elite versus
poor/citizen with autocracy being associated with rule by the elite and democratization being associated with a transfer of power from rich
to poor with a resulting change in policy from pro-elite to pro-poor. Though this set-up has a parsimonious appeal, the comparative statics
are conditional on some very simple models of both types of political regime. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) showed that
once one relaxed the simple poor versus rich nature of political conflict in their original models as well as the restriction of policy instruments,
the nature of the comparative statics with respect to inequality in the basic model changed.1 Put simply, if the groups in conflict were not
1. Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson, “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115 (2000): 1167-1199; Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review 91 (September 2001): 938963; Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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I nequalit y , D emocratization , and D emocratic C onsolidation
Christian Houle, Michigan State University

Does inequality affect democracy? Recently a large literature has argued that inequality influences both the likelihood of transition
to and away from democracy, often through similar mechanisms. In this note, I argue that it is necessary to clearly distinguish
between the effects of inequality on democratization and on democratic consolidation. As demonstrated by Przeworski et al.
regarding economic development, for example, some factors may have very different implications for these two transition processes.
Building on my previous work, I argue that inequality harms the consolidation of democracies but does not affect the likelihood of
transition to democracy itself. In other words,1 unequal countries are not more or less likely to transition to democracy, but once they
democratize they are less likely to remain democratic. I extend my previous analysis in three ways. First, my previous analysis used a single
measure of inequality: the capital shares of the value added in production. In this note, I show that my results are robust to the use of
Gini indexes. Second, I tackle the issue of endogeneity between inequality and democracy by using a novel instrumental variable strategy.
Third, the capital shares dataset I used in my previous article ended in 2000 and about seventy countries were excluded from the analysis
because of the lack of inequality data. Other recent empirical studies typically have an even larger proportion of missing observations. I use
the extended version of the capital shares dataset I introduced in Houle.2 It covers 183 countries between 1960 and 2008, and contains more
1. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
see, in particular: Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does not Affect Democratization,” World Politics 61 (October
2009): 589-622.
2. Christian Houle, “Does Inequality Harm Economic Development and Democracy? Evidence from a Complete and Comparable Data Set on Inequality,” in Carol
Lancaster and Nicolas van de Walle, eds., Oxford University Press Handbook on the Politics of Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). See Houle,
“Does Inequality Harm,” for more information on the imputation technique and the extent to which the dataset satisfies the basic criteria necessary for using such

(continued on page 21 )

Obituary for Juan Linz, continued

(continued from page 1)

love and miss him terribly.
Obituary for Juan J. Linz
On Tuesday October 1, 2013, Juan José
Linz Storch de Gracia died at the age of
86. Professor Linz was undoubtedly one
the finest political sociologists in the world.
Legendary for the encyclopedic breadth of
his knowledge, his ideas and writings deeply
influenced debates surrounding a vast array
of the century’s most important political
problems.
Linz’s
empirical
and
theoretical
contributions to scholarly research and
literature were legion. He contributed
with path-breaking work on regime types,
the dynamics of democratic breakdowns,
transitions to democracy, democratic
institutional design, presidentialism versus
parliamentarism, parties and party systems,
political and business elites, federalism,
nationalism, and fascism. His most recent

works were on inequality and political
paralysis in the United States, and on “state
nations” in countries like India where the
effort to impose a “nation state” would be in
tension with an inclusionary democracy and
internal peace.
Linz’s undying passion for such diverse but
intertwined subjects was largely a product
of his traumatic experience growing up
in interwar Europe. Born in the Weimar
Republic to a Spanish mother and German
father, Linz would witness first-hand over
the course of his childhood and adolescence a
sequence of tragic social and political events:
first in Germany, the economic crisis of the
Weimar Reublic, its subsequent breakdown,
and the rise to power and domination of the
Nazis; then, after moving with his mother to
Spain in the Spring of 1936, the breakdown
of the country’s Second Republic and
its bloody Civil War. Linz’s work would
be consistently concerned to understand
3

and therefore help avoid repeating such
collective tragedies. His work on democratic
breakdowns especially so, motivated as it was
by a sentiment well expressed by Meinecke,
the great German historian whose reaction
to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was
one that Linz was particularly fond of
quoting – namely, “This was not necessary.”
Linz came to New York in 1950 to pursue
a doctoral degree in Sociology at Columbia
University, an institution with which he
would remain affiliated for nearly two
decades until 1969, when he moved to
Yale where he would stay for the rest of his
life. Upon his arrival at Columbia, he soon
gained a reputation for his extraordinary
erudition and unparalleled command of
comparative European history as well as
social and political thought. Having already
been mentored in Spain by Javier Conde,
he took classes and worked very closely at
Columbia with Robert K. Merton, Paul

(continued on page 25)
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H aggard , K aufman , and T eo , continued
(continued from page 1)

We argued that both theoretical and
methodological progress could be made
by undertaking detailed process tracing
of the components of these models.
We examined not only the reducedform relationship between inequality
and regime change—on which there
has been surprisingly little supportive
evidence for the theory (Acemoglu
et. al., this symposium)—but also the
postulated mechanisms through which
inequality translated into pressures for
authoritarian or democratic elites to
yield power.
We
distinguished
in
particular
between distributive conflict and nondistributive conflict transitions. In the
former, pressures from below appeared
to directly influence decisions by elites
to make democratic concessions. In the
latter, pressures from below did not
play a decisive role; transitions resulted
from incumbent initiatives, intra-elite
conflicts, and/or external pressures.
In this note, we revisit the theoretical
issue of how inequality generates regime
change, and the role of distributive
conflict in particular. We summarize
new results based on an updated
version of our dataset that includes all
democratic transitions through 2008.
The results strengthen our earlier
finding that a large share of transitions
occur in the absence of significant
pressure from below, suggesting that
distributive conflict models are at best
subject to unspecified scope limitations,
including the capacity of subordinated
groups to overcome barriers to collective
action.
We conclude with some preliminary
findings on how the nature of the
transition to democratic rule may affect
the prospects for consolidation. We
find that the democracies that emerge

from distributive conflict transitions
appear more robust than those that
occur through a non-distributive
route.
Distributive Conflict Models
The work of both Boix (2003) and
Acemoglu and Robinson (A&R, 2006)
builds on the seminal Meltzer-Richard
(MR) model (1981). 3 MR provide a
formal model of redistribution under
democratic rule, and thus a baseline
for how the distribution of income
would change as a result of a transition
from authoritarian to democratic
governance. Boix (p. 37) captures
the general spirit of these models: “a
more unequal distribution of wealth
increases the redistributive demands
of the population…. [However] as the
potential level of transfers becomes
larger, the authoritarian inclinations
of the wealthy increase and the
probabilities of democratization and
democratic stability decline steadily.”
How this strategic interaction between
elites and masses plays out depends
on the level of inequality, the capacity
to repress and other parameters such
as capital mobility. Nonetheless, the
challenge to the authoritarian status
quo emanates from what Acemoglu
and Robinson call de facto as opposed
to de jure political power: the ability
of lower class groups to challenge elite
incumbents through mass mobilization,
strikes, demonstrations, riots and other
physical threats to elite security.
While the basic insight of these
distributive conflict models is intuitive,
the details are not. This can be seen
in differences in the treatment of
inequality, the central causal factor in
these models. A&R agree with Boix that
high inequality increases the incentives
3. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A Rational
Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of
Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927.

4

for authoritarian elites to repress
political demands for redistribution.
They also note—contrary to Boix—
that at low levels of inequality there is
little demand for democratization. Boix
thus sees the prospects for democratic
transitions to be inversely correlated
with inequality. A&R by contrast
conclude that the relationship between
inequality and democratic transitions
should exhibit an inverted-U pattern,
with transitions to democratic rule
most likely to occur at intermediate
levels of inequality.
A&R add another layer of complexity
by considering credible commitment
problems; these issues are directly
germane to the controversial question
of how these models treat collective
action. In addition to the possibility
of repressing outright, A&R note that
elites can maintain power by making
short-run
economic
concessions
to defuse threats from below. Yet
politically and economically excluded
groups are aware that elites can renege
on these concessions when pressures
from below subside. Lower class groups
are thus likely to press their advantage
during windows when collective action
problems are temporarily resolved.
These credible commitment problems
can generate a counterintuitive result.
It might seem that transitions would be
more likely when lower class groups are
well-organized. Yet A&R argue that this
is not necessarily the case “because with
a frequent revolutionary threat, future
redistribution becomes credible.” 4 As
an historical example, they cite the fact
that Germany—the country with the
most developed socialist movement—
created novel welfare institutions
without extending the franchise while
political elites in Britain and France
4. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 161,
200.
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were forced to extend the franchise as a
result of pressures from below.
We are hard pressed, however, to think
of contemporary examples in which a
high capacity for collective action on
the part of the poor was responsible for
stable, redistributive authoritarian rule.
The primary focus of Economic Origins
is on situations in which sporadic—if
unexplained—collective action drives
regime change. The basic game on
which all others build distinguishes
between a low threat situation in which
there are high costs for citizens to
solve collective action problems and a
high threat situation in which “citizens
are able to solve the collective action
problem relatively costlessly and/or
elites are not well organized in their
defense…” (p. 145). To what extent do
contemporary transitions comport with
this distinction between “high threat”
and “low threat” environments?

on the effects of inequality and other
structural variables. But if distributive
conflict models are correct, we would
expect to see democratic transitions
preceded by mass mobilization that
threatens authoritarian incumbents and
forces them to withdraw.

Some simple tests
Despite
their
differences, these
distributive conflict theories share
two important assumptions that are
amenable to empirical observation.
First, although there are disagreements
about the political dynamics of low and
intermediate levels of inequality, there is
agreement that democratic transitions
are unlikely at high levels of inequality.
Second—and more important for
our purposes—it is assumed that
democracy is likely to occur when
lower class groups are able to overcome
barriers to collective action—even if
only temporarily—and mobilize “de
facto power” in favor of democracy.
The assumptions about collective
action receive only limited attention in
the two books (Boix, this symposium);
in fact, A&R explicitly assume the
problem away by treating “citizens” as a
unitary actor in the formal models. And
the role of mass mobilization is almost
entirely ignored in the econometric
literature, which focuses more directly

• The mobilization of redistributive
grievances on the part of economically
disadvantaged groups or representatives
of such groups (parties, unions, NGOs)
posed a threat—a “clear and present
danger”—to the incumbency of ruling
elites, and

The qualitative data set that provided
the empirical base for the APSR
paper 5 looks directly at this causal
mechanism. Our data set assessed
the role of distributive conflict in all
transitions indicated in the Polity
IV (n=57) and Cheibub, Ghandi and
Vreeland (hereafter CGV; n=65)
datasets between 1980 and 2000. 6 We
drew a simple dichotomous distinction
between
distributive
and
nondistributive conflict transitions. We
coded “distributive conflict” transitions
as ones in which both of the following
occurred:

• The rising costs of repressing these
demands appear to have motivated
elites to make political compromises or
exit in favor of democratic challengers.
The presence of this causal mechanisms
was indicated at a minimum by a clear
temporal sequence—mass mobilization
followed by authoritarian withdrawal—
but where possible we drew on other
evidence as well, including elite
statements.
Non-distributive

transitions,

5. Haggard and Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime
Change”.
6. José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and
James R. Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship
Revisited,” Public Choice 143(April 2010): 67-101.

5

by

contrast, were ones in which these
elements were missing. Elite withdrawal
was
motivated
by
international
pressures, intra elite conflicts, or what
we call “pre-emptive” motives, in which
elites initiated regime change in the
belief that they could remain in office
or effectively veto their democratic
successors.
In coding the cases, we were deliberately
permissive, writing coding rules that
gave the benefit of the doubt to the
theory. Unlike the extant inequality
data, our coding allowed us to consider
a variety of distributive conflicts that
may not be captured by any single
inequality measure, from urban class
conflicts to ethnic, regional and sectoral
ones. The economically disadvantaged
or the organizations representing them
need not be the only ones mobilized
in opposition to the existing regime.
Although mass mobilization must partly
reflect demands for redistribution, it
can be motivated by other grievances
as well. Yet mobilization must arise
around distinctive and identifiable
inequalities at least to some extent.
Even with a very permissive coding,
we found a large share of cases (44.6
percent of the CVG transitions and
42.1 percent of the Polity cases) in
which distributive conflict played only
a marginal role. Using three separate
measures of inequality (capital’s share
of income in the manufacturing sector,
a Gini coefficient from the Estimated
Household Income Inequality Data
Set and the Vanhanen measure of land
inequality) we also found that between
29 and 34 percent of all transitions
occurred in countries ranked in the
upper tercile of these measures; a high
share of transitions were taking place
in high-inequality settings. 7 Moreover,
7. Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy:
Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not
Affect Democratization,” World Politics 61(October
2009): 589-622; University of Texas Inequality
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a high proportion of these were
distributive conflict transitions. Using
the Gini as the measure of inequality,
about 75 percent of the high-inequality
transitions were characterized by
distributive conflict; the incidence of
such high-inequality transitions was
60 percent using the land inequality
measure and 57 percent using capital’s
share of manufacturing income. We
drew two conclusions: that inequality
did not appear to have the stipulated
effect on the likelihood of transitions;
and that distributive conflict was not a
uniform driver of democratization. At
best, the effect of inequality worked
under scope conditions that were not
clearly specified in the theory.
We have subsequently extended the
Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo data
set through 2008, adding 14 cases to
the CGV transitions (n=79) and 16
cases to the Polity ones (n=73). The
results remain essentially the same; if
anything, they are even less favorable
to the distributive conflict approach.
Between 34 and 45 percent of all
transitions were in the most unequal
countries—again measured by the top
terciles—and of these, between 37.5
and 55.6 percent were distributive
conflict transitions. The percentage of
distributive conflict transitions among
the CGV coding fell from 54.4 to 53.2
percent; Polity transitions conforming
to the distributive conflict model
fell from 57.9 to only 49.3 percent.
Boix (this symposium) argues that
valid tests of the model must include
the full historical record to capture
the initial divergence associated with
democratization in the advanced
industrial states. However, this approach
makes strong assumptions about the
ability to control for incredible panel
Project, Estimated Household Income Inequality
(EHII) Dataset, Available at http://utip.gov.utexas.
edu/data.html; Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization
and Power Resources, 1850-2000, 2003, Available at
http://www.fsd.uta.fi/en/data/catalogue/FSD1216/.

heterogeneity. For the Third Wave of
recent democratization—when there
was in fact substantial divergence in
political developments across cases-a large share of transitions simply
do not reflect the causal mechanisms
stipulated in the theory, either with
respect to the role of inequality or
distributive conflict.
Extensions
Despite these findings, the distributive
conflict approach reopens the debate
about the causes and consequences of
different transition paths. Do these
paths arise from different causal
roots? And more importantly, does the
distinction between distributive and
non-distributive conflict transitions
have any enduring effect on the nature
of democratic rule? We report some
preliminary findings here.
To explore the first question, we ran
separate rare event logit estimates
with country-clustered robust standard
errors and cubic time polynomials on
the likelihood of each type of transition.
Given space limitations the regressions
are not presented here but are available
from the authors on request.
As noted, we are particularly interested
in the capacity of mass groups to
overcome barriers to collective action.
One factor – industrialization – has
long been viewed as a foundation for
mobilization along class lines. In the
regressions, we use the size of the
manufacturing sector to proxy for this
potential. Of course, the role played
in collective action by non-economic
factors such as ethnicity or religion
also require examination. Nevertheless,
it is noteworthy that manufacturing
–a basis for worker coordination and
organization–does have a consistently
significant impact on distributive
transitions and an insignificant or even
6

a negative role in non-distributive ones.
We also find that the type of
authoritarian regime appears to have
a differential effect on the likelihood
of distributive and non-distributive
transitions. Challenges from below are
less likely under authoritarian regimes
with multiparty legislatures—perhaps
because of their capacity to coopt
opposition—and more likely under
military regimes that did not typically
provide such channels of representation.
On the other hand, the distinction
between military and multiparty
regimes was not consequential in nondistributive transitions, which were
driven primarily by elite actors who
were either tolerated by incumbent
rulers or parts of the ruling circle itself.
The likelihood of non-distributive
transitions was, however, affected by
economic and international factors
proxied in the regressions. Low or
negative growth consistently predicted
non-distributive as well as distributive
transitions, presumably by intensifying
elite struggles over rents or diminishing
their capacity to manipulate electoral
support. Non-distributive transitions
(but not distributive ones) were affected
as well by the incidence of neighboring
democracies, an indication of the
relative importance of diffusion effects
and other forms of external pressure.
Again, inequality had no effect on
either type of transition.
The Effects of Transition Paths
The implicit question raised by
the discussion in the preceding
section is whether “non-distributive”
transitions—dominated by external
influences and intra-elite politics—are
less likely to result in full democracies
than ones driven at least in part by
pressures from below. Distributive
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Table 1. Regression Estimates of the Effects of CGV Distributive and NonDistributive Transitions on Polity Score in the Year Following the Transition,
1980-2008
Explanatory Variables
Transition
Non-Distributive Transition

1
3.97***
0.61

Distributive Transition
Control Variables
Log GDP
Log GDP per capita
Trade Openness
Growth
Capital Openness
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
Military Dictatorship Dummy
N
Groups

2

2.67***
1.04

3

4

4.92***
0.72

2.71***
1.04
4.93***
0.72

4.13***
0.85
-4.55***
1.46
0.04***
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.15
0.28
-3.51
2.71
-4.31***
1.03

4.15***
0.85
-4.61***
1.48
0.04***
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.13
0.28
-3.56
2.72
-4.16***
1.04

4.17***
0.85
-4.61***
1.48
0.04***
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.15
0.28
-3.53
2.72
-4.26***
1.03

4.17***
0.85
-4.60***
1.47
0.04***
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.15
0.28
-3.52
2.72
-4.31***
1.03

2234
90

2234
90

2234
90

2234
90

conflict transitions may pose dangers of
destabilizing polarization for newly
established democratic governments,
but it is also reasonable to assume
that such governments would be more
responsive to a mobilized citizenry.
Governments emerging from nondistributive
transitions
face
no
equivalent pressures or restraints on the
abuse of power.
The fixed-effects regressions below
address this issue by examining the way
distributive and non-distributive CGV
transitions, defined more narrowly on
the basis of transitional elections, affect
subsequent Polity scores, which provide
a broader measure of differences in
political form that includes political
rights and government accountability.
Both distributive and non-distributive
CGV transitions have a significant
impact on the Polity score, but the
coefficients for distributive transitions
are almost twice as large as those for
non-distributive ones (4.93 versus 2.71

in model 4).
A distributive transition increases
a country’s Polity score by almost 5
points relative to a “non-transition”
year; a non-distributive transition by
only about 2.7 points. These results
are robust to the inclusion of a variety
of control variables, including: GDP,
growth, trade openness, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and prior rule by a
military dictatorship. In future work,
we will consider the longer-run path
of democratic consolidation in the two
types of transitions, but preliminary
inspection of the cases suggests that
non-distributive conflict transitions are
followed by democracies that are not
only weaker but more prone to reversal.
Conclusion
The work of Boix and A&R has
opened up new avenues of research
about how conflicts over redistribution
affect authoritarian and democratic
rule. Yet inequality does not appear to
7

be associated with regime change in
a straightforward way, as Acemoglu
et. al. note in this symposium. Core
theoretical assumptions about the causal
importance of distributive demands
from below appear to pertain only in
a subset of cases. Distributive and
non-distributive transitions are driven
by distinct political and economic
dynamics, including differences in
the potential for mass groups to
overcome barriers to collective action.
We also find preliminary evidence
that distributive conflict transitions
generate more robust democracies, at
least in the short run. These results
suggest the importance of revisiting
the logic and consequences of different
transition paths.
Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye
Krause Professor of Korea-Pacific Studies
and director of the Korea-Pacific program at
University of California, San Diego. Robert
R. Kaufman is a professor of political science
at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.
Terence K. Teo is a PhD candidate in political
science at Rutgers University.
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interplay between economic structure and
political outcomes and in their empirical
approaches to testing hypotheses, but they
begin from the same simple theoretical
premise: the emergence of democracy is a
function of the incumbent autocratic elite’s
relative fear of redistribution to (and by)
the poor – and the higher the inequality,
the
greater
the
fear.
This syllogism between democracy and
redistribution has become conventional
wisdom. It is intuitive, has deep
philosophical roots, and has long been
invoked on the political left and right
(albeit for different reasons – to evoke hope
versus instill fear). Moreover, the argument
gained widespread academic credence with
Meltzer and Richard’s seminal medianvoter model.3 This model assumes that
under democracy the tax system will be
progressive: All citizens pay the same
proportion of their income, but benefits
are universal and uniform, so that everyone
receives the same amount in subsidy. This
means that the rich pay more than they
receive while the opposite is true for the
poor. Consequently, those with belowmean incomes favor redistribution, while
those above the mean oppose it. Because the
income distribution is always right-skewed,
the median voter has below-mean income
and hence desires redistribution, and this
desire intensifies as the gap between mean
and median income widens. The implication
is straightforward: higher inequality
implies greater redistributive pressures.
This same logic underpins redistributivist
theories of regime change. As such,
the question of “who matters” in these
approaches boils down to the conflict
between the rich and the relatively poor
median voter, who - under majority rule sets the tax rate. The elite wants to maintain
the autocratic status quo, under which taxes
are zero, while the poor prefer democracy,
3. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A Rational
Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of
Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927.

which entails some redistribution. The
higher the inequality, the more the
autocratic elite have incentives to dig in
their heels, just as the poor have stronger
incentives to rebel. Democracy is thus least
likely when inequality is high, when the
wealthy have less to fear from redistribution
to the poor. (Boix and A&R differ
regarding the poor’s relative incentives to
push for democracy under low inequality.)
We suggest that the redistributivist
approach to regime change is theoretically
misleading and misses the mark empirically.
In our 2010 article,4 we argued that this
approach relies on a set of questionable
assumptions - about the nature of
inequality, about the relevant actors in
democratization, and about those actors’
political preferences - and also finds little
empirical support in cross-national analysis.
In our view democracy is not a function of
the monolithic elite’s fear of the poor, it
is about the emergence of splits between
incumbent and rising economic elites,
with the latter fearing the expropriative
power of the state far more than they fear
the redistributive threat from the poor.
Our argument offers a novel explanation
of the political consequences of inequality.
While redistributivist arguments conceive
of inequality as the ratio of incomes between
rich and poor, we differentiate between the
political consequences of land and income
inequality. We concur that land inequality
retards democratization, signifying the
political power of landed elites, who seek
to maintain the political and economic
status quo. However, counterintuitively,
we suggest that income inequality –
counterintuitively for the conventional
wisdom – promotes democratization.
The conventional view is misleading
because scholars have never properly
4. Ben Ansell and David Samuels, “Inequality and
Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,”
Comparative Political Studies 43 (December 2010):
1543-1574.

8

connected social-class structures to
different Gini coefficients. Redistributivist
arguments assume that a relatively low
Gini implies that the median voter
is a member of the (relatively large)
“middle” class, sociologically speaking,
and likewise assume that a high Gini
indicates that the middle class is relatively
small, and that the median voter is poor.
In fact, this is backwards. Consider
the example we provided in our 2010
paper: which country - China in 1880
or the UK in 1867 - is more likely to
democratize? Everyone knows the answer
to this question, but what remains less wellknown is that China’s Gini at that time was
.24, while the UK’s was .51. In the 19th
century, the UK had a large and growing
“middle” class, while China did not. These
are not outliers: In poor and economically
stagnant societies, a low Gini does not
imply a large middle class. It means that
nearly everyone is equally poor - and
that the median voter is a member of the
impoverished masses. In contrast, relatively
poor but growing societies typically
see higher Ginis not because the “1%”
exploits the “99%,” but because economic
development brings about greater intergroup income differentials. With very
few exceptions, in sociological terms high
Gini coefficients in a developing country
indicate a relatively large middle class, even
if the majority of a country’s population
remains poor, as in Victorian-era Britain.
This last point is crucial: A low Gini means
that the impoverished masses comprise well
over a majority of the population - 98%
in 1880 China, e.g.. Yet even in wealthy
examples such as 19th-century Britain, the
(sociological) “middle” classes (bourgeoisie
and white-collar workers) are not to be
found in the (mathematical) “middle” of the
income distribution but in the top decile, or
at most the top quintile. The working classes
comprise at most the next 30% (usually
much less), while incumbent autocratic
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elites are (again, at most) in the top 1-2%.5
The default situation in a developing
autocracy over the last 200 years is that the
impoverished rural masses comprise more
than a majority of the population. It is worth
noting that since Moore, scholars have
debated whether the working class should
also be included as a relevant actor in the
study of regime change, in addition to the
bourgeoisie.6 No qualitative scholar has ever
suggested that those below the organized
working class on the income distribution
represent a credible threat to elite interests.
Given this, and given that in the real world
the median voter is almost always a member
of the poor underclass, redistributivist
arguments tend to exaggerate the
political relevance of the median voter. In
developing autocracies, it is safer to assume
that the poor majority - Marx’s famous
“potatoes in a sack” - is politically inert,
rather than a potential threat to those who
control the coercive power of the state.
Gaining proper understanding of how
different class structures correspond to
different Gini coefficients returns us to
the question of “who matters” for regime
change, and why income inequality is
positively related to democratization. Our
approach flips the redistributive theoretical
approach on its head in terms of who
matters and why. If the median voter is
poor and the poor are politically inert, then
the poor cannot represent a potential threat
to autocratic elites in a hypothetical future
democracy. Instead, a more theoretically
fruitful approach begins with the idea that
the principal threat to incumbent autocratic
5. Branco Milanovic, Peter Lindert, and Jeffrey
Williamson, “Pre-Industrial Inequality,” The
Economic Journal 121 (March 2011): 255–272; Adam
Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History
of Electoral Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1986), 35.
6. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy (New York: Beacon, 1966); Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D.
Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Ruth
Collier, Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class
and Elites in Western Europe and South America (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

elites comes from other relatively wealthy
citizens - disenfranchised, newly-emerging
economic groups who fear expropriation of
their wealth and property by the incumbent
autocratic elite, and who thus have powerful
incentives to organize and mobilize in
defense of their interests and wealth.
This dynamic - of elite competition,
rather than conflict between rich and
poor - is quite common historically.7
What causes elite competition to emerge?
Redistributivist approaches suggest that
inequality results from dividing the gains
from growth in a single-sector economy.
We suggest that income inequality results
from the distribution of resources both
within and between two different sectors
of a growing economy - a stagnant
agricultural sector and a growing industrial
sector, for example. This allows us to
explain why different types of inequality
have distinct political consequences.
As Simon Kuznets famously explained
decades ago,8 income inequality tends to
increase with the onset of industrialization,
because both urban labor and especially
urban bourgeois groups benefit. Our twosector model of endogenous political
change derives from classic ‘dual sector’
models of economic growth, in which
new economic groups appropriate most
of the gains from industrialization. These
models help understand why rising income
inequality does not mean that an existing
elite is simply growing richer at everyone
else’s expense, but instead signals the
emergence of new, rival economic groups.
Why do rising elites press for
democratization? Our argument extends
the logic of North and Weingast and
other neo-institutionalist theories of the
7. Collier, Paths toward Democracy; Stephan Haggard
and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime
Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of
Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review
106 (August 2012): 495–516.
8. Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income
Inequality,” American Economic Review 45 (March
1955): 1–28.

9

state9 to the study of regime change. The
key political “threat” in these accounts is
not that the poor will expropriate the rich
but that the incumbent elite - through
their control of the state - will expropriate
everyone else. This view echoes Lockean
themes from Enlightenment liberalism
about the symbiotic relationship between
democracy and property, and suggests
that liberalization of an autocratic
regime occurs when new outsider groups
emerge who demand political power
commensurate with their growing
economic influence. This imbalance
of power is a recipe for contestation
over the nature of the political regime.
Our approach to understanding elite
interests implies that the Meltzer-Richard
model offers a misleading and limited
notion of what the state ‘does.’ Acemoglu
and Robinson, for example, emphasize that
autocratic elites cannot credibly commit to
redistribute income because when threats by
the masses to revolt die down the elite have
incentives to revert to zero redistribution.
Yet all redistributivist analyses constrain
elites to follow the Meltzer-Richard model
of redistribution - a flat tax and a uniform
subsidy applied to all citizens, although there
is little reason to believe that elites should
be so constrained, either theoretically or
historically. What is to stop autocratic elites
from taxing others but not themselves, or
from spending money on ‘club goods’
rather than universal benefits, for example?
The redistributivist approach precludes a
predatory state that expropriates income
from rising elites and the masses - and yet
9. Douglass North and Barry Weingast,
“Constitutions and Commitment,” Journal of
Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-832;
Robert Bates and Donald Lien, “A Note on Taxation,
Development, and Representative Government,”
Politics and Society 14 (March 1985): 53-70;
Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988); Mancur Olson,
“Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,”
American Political Science Review 87 (September
1993): 567-576. On classical “dual“ models, see
W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with
Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The Manchester
School 22 (May 1954): 139-191; John R. Harris and
Michael P. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment and
Development: A Two-Sector Analysis,” American
Economic Review 60 (March 1970): 126–142.
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the threat to life, liberty and property is
central to the nature of autocratic regimes.

Figure

1:

Inequality,

Democracy

and

Public

Spending

In short, once we understand that in a
developing autocracy high Ginis indicate
the presence of sizable rising middle (and
working) classes, we can better understand
the relationship between economic growth,
income inequality, and regime change.
Democracy is not about redistribution - it
is about taxation without representation, a
conflict between rival economic elites for
control over the expropriative and coercive
authority of the State. The most propitious
‘structural’ conditions for democracy
in a developing society are when land
inequality is low but income inequality is
high. Democracy is less likely to emerge
when both land and income inequality
are low, even less likely when both are
high, and least likely when land inequality
is high and income inequality is low.
As these conditions change, the relative
power of rural and urban interests change.
The empirical analyses in our 2010
paper, and several additional tests in our
forthcoming book, confirm our predictions.
We find no evidence that income inequality
retards democratization, either in a dataset
covering 1820 to 1992 or in a different
dataset from 1950 to 2004. We also find
no evidence for the inverted-U relationship
between inequality and democratization
that Acemoglu and Robinson suggest.
Instead, we find a strong positive
correlation between income inequality and
democratization, even as land inequality
exhibits the expected negative effect. Our
findings suggest that the study of regime
change and “endogenous” democratization”
would profit from a more nuanced
understanding of both inequality and the
socioeconomic structure of competing elites.
In our forthcoming book we also explore
our
theory’s
indirect
implications.
Redistributivist
approaches
presume
that the combination of inequality and

democracy should produce higher levels
of redistributive spending. By contrast, our
approach implies that a triumphant rising
economic elite would not redistribute to
the poor. After democratization this new
elite might increase taxes on the old elite
to help pay for public spending, but only
on club goods - services that primarily benefit
their own economic class. If we are correct that
high income inequality reflects the power
of this rising elite, then the combination
of inequality and democracy should
be correlated with lower universalistic
redistributive spending to the poor than in
a democracy with low income inequality.
Figure 1, taken from our book manuscript,
demonstrates this pattern vividly. Building
on work by Lindert,10 we collected original
data on redistributive spending for 62
countries between 1880 and 1930. Figure 1
10. Peter Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending
and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century
(Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).

10

shows the effect of democratization (using
the Boix-Rosato index) on redistributive
spending (measured as a change in %
of GDP at 10-year intervals) at various
levels of inequality. Clearly, spending
only increases after a regime change
when income inequality is low – and
redistributive spending actually declines
at high levels of income inequality. These
findings are precisely the opposite of what
redistributivist theories would predict.
Our approach also generates predictions
about citizens’ preferences for redistribution
and democracy under autocracy. The
redistributivist approach predicts that the
rich want low redistribution, worry more
about redistribution when inequality is
high, and tend to oppose democracy, largely
because of its redistributive implications.
We agree that richer citizens support
low redistribution to the poor. However,
given our findings about the relationship
between inequality and public spending
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Table 1: Probability of Believing Democracy is Very Desirable
Low Income

Medium Income

High Income

Anti-Redistribution

0.56

0.60

0.64

Ambivalent

0.54

0.55

0.56

Pro-Redistribution

0.52

0.50

0.48

under democracy, our argument implies
that wealthier citizens will be relatively less
concerned about redistribution to the poor
where income inequality is high, because
inequality proxies for the presence of a
politically and economically stronger middle
class, who prefer to shift public spending
towards itself and away from the poor.
Our model makes a similar prediction
about preferences for democracy. Under
autocracy, we expect relatively wealthier
citizens - save for the relatively few
members of the incumbent elite - to
strongly prefer democratization, since
members of this group face greater risks of
losses from expropriation under autocracy,
relative to the poor. Table 1, again drawn
from our book manuscript, confirms this

expectation. We analyzed 31 samples of
individuals across 23 autocracies covered
by the World Values Survey, which asks
people about their preferences over
democracy and redistribution. Table 1
explores how citizens answer a question
about whether a democracy would be
a good way to govern the country. We
are interested in the combined effects of
income and attitudes about redistribution
to the poor. Redistributivist approaches
expect high income / anti-redistribution
individuals to be least supportive of
democracy, yet we find precisely the reverse.
As per our elite-competition model,
richer citizens - indeed those who least
favor redistribution to the poor - actually
most strongly support democratization.

11

Taken together, our empirical findings about
1) the conditions that foster regime change;
2) the relationship between inequality,
regime type and public spending; and 3) the
preferences of citizens under autocracy all
present a serious theoretical and empirical
challenge to redistributivist models.
Inequality does not signify that autocratic
elites fear the downtrodden masses. It
instead signals the growth of new economic
actors – rising elites who demand political
power commensurate with their wealth. We
suggest that our argument - which focuses
on fear of the expropriative threat of those
who control the state versus fear of the
redistributive threat from the poor - offers a
better approach to the comparative study of
regime change and its contemporary effort
to understand the complicated interplay
between growth, inequality, and the politics
of democratization across time and space.
Ben Ansell is professor of comparative
democratic institutions and international
relations and professorial fellow at
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(continued from page 2)

Table 1: Economic Inequality and Unconditional Political Transitions
Index of knowledge distribution
0-0.2
0.2-0.4
0.4-0.6
0.6-0.8
0.8-1
Proportion of family farms
0-0.2
0.2-0.4
0.4-0.6
0.6-0.8
0.8-1

Annual probability of
Transition to democracy
Democratic breakdown
0.53
1.75
3.09
3.94
0.00

8.74
5.29
1.00
0.40
0.70

1.15
1.76
0.88
1.94
3.13

4.83
2.67
1.63
0.46
0.23

cases since the emergence of contemporary
democracy in the 19th century to generate
credible results. Most of the significant
(at least until the late 20th century) and
lasting political change occurred during the
democratization wave that started with the
liberal revolutions of 1848 and concluded
right after World War One. Using post1960 data (while adding country fixed
effects) only risks misestimating the true
effects of economic and social change
on political development since there
was little within-country variance from
1960 well into the early 1990s. Empirical
analyses of democratization are similar to
empirical growth theory in one important
regard: employing postwar data sets may
be good enough to estimate convergence
effects (among economies that have
moved beyond the take-off stage) but it
is not adequate to determine the sources
of initial divergence across countries.
Finding the appropriate data to tests the
effects of inequality is difficult because
systematic income inequality data start late
in time. An alternative is to employ two
(August 2012): 495–516; Carles Boix and Susan
Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World Politics
55 ( July 2003): 517-49; Carles Boix, “Democracy,
Development and the International System,”
American Political Science Review 105 (November
2011): 809-828. See accompanying papers in this
issue and Haggard and Kaufman, “Inequality and
Regime Change,” for a more exhaustive list of recent
empirical tests of RMD.

correlates of income and wealth inequality:
the distribution of agricultural property (the
area of family farms as a percentage of the total
area of holdings) and the extension of skilled
or educated workers. Both variables track
economic inequality relatively well. For the
period after 1950, the correlation coefficient
between the Gini index of economic
inequality (excluding socialist economies)
and the percentage of family farms is -0.66.
For countries with a per capita income below
$2,000 the correlation coefficient is -0.75.
The coefficient of correlation of the index
of education and the Gini index is -0.59.2
To test the impact of inequality, we
should not compute different types of
(redistributive versus non-redistributive)
transitions (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 2012)
without looking at the overall underlying
distribution of cases (where transitions may
or may not occur). Hence, Table 1 reports
the probability of democratic transitions and
democratic breakdowns for different levels
(estimated as actual transitions over total
1 country-years in each category) after 1850.
Higher levels of human capital equality
are associated with a higher probability
of transiting to democracy (except for the
highest values) and a lower likelihood of
democratic breakdowns. Land equality
only has a democratic stabilization effect.
2. Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization and Power
Resources, 1850-2000, 2003, Available at http://
www.fsd.uta.fi/en/data/catalogue/FSD1216/;
Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A New Data
Set Measuring Income Inequality,” The World Bank
Economic Review 10 (September 1996): 565-591.
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Table 2 examines the correlates of democratic
transitions and democratic stability using a
data set that spans from 1850 to 2000. Models
are estimated via standard pooled OLS
regression and have the following structure:
Dit= α+βt-10 Di,t-10 +ρt-10Ii,t-10 +ρt-10 Ci,t-k +δt+ηi+εit
where Dit is either the continuous Polity
IV index (normalized between 0 and 1)
or the Boix-Miller-Rosato dichotomous
index of democracy, I corresponds to the
different economic inequality measures,
C are a stack of control variables, ηi is a
country specific effect, δt is a period-specific
constant, and εit is an error term. In Columns
1 and 3, which examine the covariates of
transitions to democracy, the value of the
dependent variable is the maximum value
of democracy at either time t or time t-1:
this effectively restricts the analysis to
those cases in which there has been an
increase in democracy. In Column 2 and 4,
which estimate the impact of inequality on
transitions3 away from democracy, the value
of the dependent variable is the minimum
value of democracy at either time t or time
t-1: this limits the analysis to those cases in
which there has been a decline in the level
of democracy. The standard estimations
of political transitions employ nonlinear
models to determine the effects of income.
However, I here use linear models because
nonlinear models do not generate consistent
estimators in the presence of fixed effects.
The indices of family farms, human capital
and non-agrarian employment have
been normalized from 0 to 1. All models
include the log of per capita income,
which is systematically introduced on all
democratization models. Controlling for
per capita income allows us to estimate
the non-income or development effect of
3. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi,
“Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics
49 ( January 1997): 155-183; Boix and Stokes,
“Endogenous Democratization;” David L. Epstein,
Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and
Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic Transitions,”
American Journal of Political Science 50 ( July 2006):
551–69.
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Table 2: Inequality and Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns,
1850-2000
Polity IV Index

Dichotomous Index of Democracy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Transition to Breakdown of
Transition to Breakdown of
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy Democracy
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Democracy t-10

0.591***
(0.038)

0.735***
(0.037)

0.552***
(0.039)

0.695***
(0.045)

Log GDP per capita t-10

0.059
(0.039)

0.036
(0.032)

0.044
(0.049)

0.052
(0.037)

Proportion of Family
Farms t-10

-0.071
(0.077)

0.117***
(0.045)

-0.189*
(0.103)

0.157***
(0.052)

Index of Human Capital t-10

0.314**
(0.136)

-0.107
(0.231)

0.462***
(0.129)

0.000
(0.128)

Proportion of Population
In Non-Agrarian Sector t-10

-0.256
(0.242)

0.187
(0.199)

0.065
(0.347)

0.300
(0.274)

Soviet Occupation

-0.263***
(0.056)

-0.028
(0.035)

-0.321***
(0.082)

-0.028
(0.040)

International Order

-0.015
(0.028)

0.013
(0.023)

-0.000
(0.039)

0.049**
(0.025)

Allied with US

0.162***
(0.065)

0.012
(0.024)

0.229***
(0.087)

0.054
(0.049)

Alliance with US * Cold War

-0.202***
(0.067)

-0.047**
(0.022)

-0.181*
(0.096)

-0.082*
(0.044)

Observations
806
806
852
852
Countries
132
132
137
137
R-squared
0.81
0.87
0.75
0.83
Fixed-effects OLS regressions with country dummies, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05;*p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses

our inequality measures. The model adds
four variables measuring the international
system: an annual one coding the
international system as anti-democratic,
neutral or pro-democratic;4 a dummy
specifying whether the country was an ally
of the USA or not; an interaction between
1
alliance with the USA and Cold war; and
a dummy specifying whether the country is
under the control of the Soviet Union or not.
Notice, in the first place, that the coefficient
of per capita income remains positive
but it declines in size and loses statistical
significance in all models. This implies
4. See Carles Boix, “Political Order and Inequality,”
Unpublished manuscript, 2013, for a discussion of
this classification. The international system had an
“anti-democratic” effect on domestic politics till 1848,
from 1933 to 1942 and from 1948 to 1990. It was
“neutral” between 1849 and 1918 and from 1943 to
1947. It was pro-democratic otherwise.

that per capita income, as employed in
the modernization literature in postwar
samples, behaves mostly as a proxy for
other more fundamental factors. Generally
speaking, the level of inequality matters
for democratization. However, it is worth
noting that the causes of democratic
transitions and of democratic breakdowns
are partly different. Democratic transitions
are more likely to occur in countries with
higher levels of human capital (Columns 1
and 3). Given that the dependent variable
ranges from 0 to 1, the effect is very
substantive. In turn, democratic breakdowns
are mostly conditioned by the distribution
of assets in the agrarian world. A higher
proportion of family farms reduces the
probability that a democratic country will
revert to authoritarian rule. (A positive
coefficient means that an authoritarian
regime is less likely to take place.) In
13

other words, in an agrarian economy the
probability of a democratic breakdown
falls to 0 as one moves from concentrated
land ownership (as in countries such as
Russia before the Stolypin reforms and the
Soviet Revolution, Spain for most of the
20th century, and most Latin American
nations) to the highly fragmented property
systems (as in countries such as Norway, the
United States, and Canada, where family
farms represented three- to four-fifths of
all land) at the turn of the 20th century.
International factors matter to explain
democratic transitions. The dummy variable
“Soviet occupation” is statistically significant
and it is associated with a reduction of
0.32 points in the movement toward more
democratic institutions. An alliance with
the USA boosts democratic transitions
but only after the end of the Cold War.
The international system seems to affect
the stability of democracies too: a more
pro-democratic environment reduces the
occurrence of democratic breakdowns.
These finding may explain why models
that estimate the effect of inequality in
the postwar period only get mixed results.
Rationality and Material Interests
RMD assume (1) rational, (2) self-interested
actors mostly motivated by (3) material
payoffs. Questioning the assumption of
rationality (defined as instrumentally-driven
action to achieve certain goals) has been
quite common since, at least, the work of
Green and Shapiro (1994). Other than
going back to detailed historical narratives,
the alternative they suggest to replace the
rationality assumption is unclear. In my
opinion, a fruitful way ahead may consist of
applying the satisficing rules of behavior that
Bendor et al. (2011) use to model elections.
Most of the critiques to RMD are directed
to the decision to define the payoffs of the
game in economic terms. Material payoffs
play a key role in a wide range of situations –
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as attested, for example, by a large literature
on economic voting and on the class basis
of political alignments. Still, they are not the
exclusive cause of political action. Ethnic
identity, religious preferences, political
status, etc. also matter.5 What is central to
RMD and to the “democracy as equilibrium”
literature is the impact of heterogeneous
preferences and capabilities on the ways
in which individuals decide to govern
themselves. Again, this means that noneconomic heterogeneity is equally susceptible
to be brought into democratization theory.
Political Actors
Critiques of RMD complain that social
classes are treated as ‘objective’ phenomena
rather than outcomes of social and political
mobilization. In other words, RMD
disregard both the literature on collection
action and a rich historiographical tradition
on the formation of the working class.6
I find this critique partly misplaced. In
Boix (2003, pp. 27-30, 44-46) I indicate
explicitly that both the level of organization
and the extent of class (or, more precisely,
group) consciousness matter – and that,
because they affect the costs of each side,
they affect the probabilities of different
regime outcomes. It is, however, true that
I treat those factors as exogenous variables.
No model can endogenize everything.
Political Process
RMD are also depicted as painting a
very narrow account of social conflict
“as a function of a small but monolithic
elite’s fear of the impoverished multitude”
(Ansell and Samuels 2010, p. 1544) and of
political transitions as events where “elites
5. Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A.
Siegel, and Michael M. Ting, A Behavioral Theory
of Elections (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2011); Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 50.
6. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1965); Edward Palmer
Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class
(New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Ira Katznelson
and Aristide R. Zolberg, Working-Class Formation:
Ninteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the
United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986).

must confront political-cum-distributive
pressure from below” to the point that if
“the repression of these challenges appears
too costly (…) the elites make institutional
compromises as a result” (Haggard and
Kaufman 2012, p. 497). This rather reductive
interpretation of RMD is mistaken.
The model in Boix (2003) departs
from Przeworski’s seminal treatment of
democracy as an equilibrium7 extending
it in two ways: it applies the idea of
“equilibrium” to all political regimes and it
links the actors’ payoffs to specific material
conditions. To examine its implications,
the model contains a game sequence with
different paths and outcomes (e.g., once
the ruling group widens the franchise, the
unenfranchised group accepts the reform).
Nonetheless, the fundamental value of the
model is its comparative statistic in terms
of the robustness of each outcome (e.g., that
democracy and low inequality are compatible
under most conditions) and much less
about the particular mechanisms through
which transitions take place. Transitions
from authoritarian rule can occur as a result
of military defeat (Argentina 1983), the
death of a dictator (Spain 1975), a peaceful
revolution (Portugal 1975), a “mismanaged”
referendum (Chile 1989) or the collapse of
the occupying power (the Baltic countries
in 1991). Whether democracy emerges
and survives has to be set in the context
of the broad economic and organizational
parameters of the model. Thus, Haggard and
Kaufman (2012) is extremely informative
as a study of transitional paths and is very
valuable as a call to develop models that
integrate the process of transition itself.
But their work is less convincing as a
critique of the theoretical core of RMD.
The depiction of RMD as a clash between
the “elite” and the “masses” is also reductive
in a second sense. The economy in Boix
(2003) is thought of as a distribution of
individuals (heterogeneous in incomes)
7. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market:
Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
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grouped into a set of discrete (normally
two) representative types for the sake of
simplicity. The distribution of income, which
may vary from complete equality to extreme
inequality, is then related to a political
equilibrium. Hence, expressions such as
“under conditions of equality elites have little
to fear from democratization” (Ansell and
Samuels 2010, p. 1547) do not make much
sense: under conditions of equality, there
are no (economic) elites properly speaking.
Moreover, in Boix (2003) the initial model
characterizes society as having two groups.
But it contains a section with three actors,
defined by different levels of income and
by different levels of asset specificity,
and predictions about partial democracy
(collinear to income or based on cross-class
alliances). Limited democracy takes place
when the middle class (or the industrial
bourgeoisie, once we defined wealthier
strata by their type of asset) grows richer.
In turn, universal suffrage takes place as the
lower strata get closer to the middle strata
(pp. 47-57). In that sense, the models in
Ansell and Samuels (2010) and Boix (2003)
are extremely similar.8 Ansell and Samuels’
results on the growing probability of partial
democracy as the process of industrialization
takes off go in the same direction.
This similarity implies that, as Haggard
and Kaufman (2012) acknowledge, classbased and sector-based models are not
incompatible with each other. Instead,
sector-based models (or what Ansell and
Samuels define as “intra-elite” conflict) are an
extension of the general model of democracy
as equilibrium. Sectoral (intra-elite) conflict
will take place when wealthy sectors are
differentiated by income and type of assets
(non-fixed versus fixed) and when nonwealthy strata are not mobilized. If the latter
are mobilized, political conflict may be crossclass (a sector of the wealthy and all or part
of the non-wealthy allied against the other,
8. A minor point is that income inequality is in part
based on land rents and therefore does not capture
well the inequality generated by capital returns and
labor wages. Hence, Ansell and Samuels should have
used fixed vs. non-fixed assets inequality.
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mainly depending on asset specificity) or
class-based (as in the initial two-class model).
Underlying Tax Model
The choice of the median voter tax model
developed by Romer (1975) and Meltzer
and Richards (1981) has been rather
controversial.9 The model is much more
flexible that some concede: one can amend
it in multiple ways to introduce public
goods spending, non-distortionary taxes,
individuals having different beliefs about
the effects of taxes, etc. The fact that the
model is empirically wrong – in terms of
predicting that taxes would be higher in
more unequal societies – is what justifies
9. The initial two-class model was used by Boix,
Democracy and Redistribution, and Carles Boix,
“Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in
the Contemporary World,” World Politics 60 (April
2008): 390-437; Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A
Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal
of Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927.

RMD. RMD endogenize the tax rate to
the distribution of income and predict
that taxes will not be high in unequal
societies because net payers will block them.
Ansell and Samuels (2010) point out that
RMD assume tax rates will never be lower
than 0.This assumption can be relaxed.In their
formal exploration of the democratization
of 19th-century Britain, Justman and
Gradstein (1999) allow the rich to tax the
poor (when the latter are disenfranchised).10
This may make the model too simplistic
in the following sense: both assets and
income become wholly determined by the
power ratio (between classes). As Justman
and Gradstein (p. 111) write, “preindustrial
levels of inequality reﬂect an equilibrium
10. Moshe Justman and Mark Gradstein, “The
Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the
Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century
Britain,” Explorations in Economic History 36 (April
1999): 109-127.
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in which total economic resources are
stagnant and power is concentrated in the
hands of an elite minority who use it to
maximize their political rents.” Political
liberalization then shifts the distribution
of income. (What they do not endogenize,
however, is the power ratio itself.) An
alternative to this linear relationship
between political power and income is to
consider a model where the distribution of
income is the joint product of economic
technologies and political institutions. This
is what I attempt to do in Boix (2013).11
Carles Boix is the Robert Garrett
Professor of Politics and Public Affairs
in the Department of Politics and the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs at Princeton University.
11. Boix, “Political Order and Inequality.”
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rich versus poor, but for example based
on ethnic, religious or regional cleavages,
it was not necessarily true that increasing
inequality, in the sense of a higher Gini
coefficient, would exacerbate conflict
between groups. It might just result in
increased redistribution within groups.
More generally, though there is now
convincing econometric evidence for the
importance of the central mechanisms of
Acemoglu and Robinson’s early work,2 still,
as emphasized by Haggard and Kaufman
(2012), there may be different mechanisms
that lead to democratization and these can
have different comparative statics from
those presented in Acemoglu and Robinson
(2000, 2001). For instance, in Lizzeri and
Persico (2004) democratization can occur
because political competition with a limited
franchise leads to clientelistic outcomes that
are inefficient for at least a sub-set of the
elite.3 Extending voting rights can induce
more efficient non-clientelistic competition
over public goods that is favored by these
elites. Depending on the decision structure
within elites, democratization can occur
for very different reasons than those
developed by Acemoglu and Robinson.4
These theoretical extensions of the basic
model suggested that it was unlikely that
the simple comparative statics of inequality
suggested by the early work would be
found in the data. Moreover, even if one
found these in a convincing way one would
2. See for instance in Toke S. Aidt and Peter S.
Jensen, “Workers of the World Unite! Franchise
Extension and the Threat of Revolution in Europe,
1820-1938,” http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/aidt/
papers/web/workers/workers.pdf, 2012.
3. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman,
“Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic
Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule,”
American Political Science Review 106 (August
2012): 495-516; Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola
Persico, “Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage?
Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an
Application to Britain’s Age of Reform,’’ Quarterly
Journal of Economics 119 (2004): 707-765.
4. See also Humberto Llavador and Robert J. Oxoby,
“Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005): 11551192.

have to deal with complicated issues of
identification. For example, autocracies
which were unequal no doubt differ in
many others ways from autocracies which
are equal, and to test causal hypotheses
about the impact of inequality on regime
transition it is necessary to control in
some way for these omitted variables.
It is also necessary to control properly
for common trends influencing the
variables to avoid the problem of ‘spurious
regression’. Since democracy tends to
move in waves and many other variables
such as GDP per-capita are correlated
across countries, this is a potent issue here.
Since this early work a great deal of research
has gone into investigating empirically
the factors that lead to democratization
and democratic consolidation. In largely
unpublished work which accompanied
Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009),5 the authors
found no robust evidence that inequality
influences either democratizations or
democratic consolidation. The innovation of
this empirical work is that it adopted for the
first time standard panel data econometric
techniques to control for omitted variables
with country fixed effects and common
trends with time effects. The importance
of the fixed effects methodology is that it
focuses on the ‘within variation’ and asks,
in this context: as a country becomes more
or less unequal, does that induce changes
in the extent to which it is democratic? By
focusing on this variation one mitigates
the biases than come from examining
the cross-sectional (between) variation
that is mired in unobservable differences
between countries. The importance of
the inclusion of time effects is that they
control for common trends amongst the
variables mitigating the danger of spurious
5. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James
A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “Income and
Democracy”, American Economic Review 98 ( June
2008): 808-842; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson,
James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “Reevaluating
the Modernization Hypothesis,” Journal of Monetary
Economics 56 (November 2009): 1043-1058. See,
however, Table 5 in this essay.
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regression. The empirical work of Acemoglu
et al. showed that some of the most famous
empirical results in the literature, such
as the correlation between income percapita and democratic consolidation, were
not robust to controlling for omitted
variables. This paper went even further
than fixed effects models by providing a full
identification strategy using instrumental
variables, an exercise that confirmed the
basic fixed effects findings. This project
also revealed that there was no robust
relationship between inequality and either
the creation or consolidation of democracy.
Other studies have since found different
things, but to do so they have deviated
from the econometric approach of
Acemoglu et al in significant ways. For
example, Esptein et al. (2006) presented
evidence that was consistent with the
inverted-U shape hypothesis of Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001). Houle (2009) found
that while inequality has no impact on
democratization, higher inequality reduces
the probability that a democracy will stay
democratic. Yet neither paper made any
attempt to control for omitted variable
bias, for example using country fixed
effects. Therefore, it is quite likely that these
findings are driven by omitted variables and
thus do not represent causal relationships
between inequality and regime transition.
Freeman and Quinn (2012) moved beyond
studies of the average effect of inequality
on regime transitions investigating whether
or not there are heterogeneous effects
of inequality that depend on the extent
of globalization.6 They do claim to find
robust effects of inequality on the change
in the polity score, the sign of which is
6. David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone,
Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic
Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science
50 ( July 2006): 551–69; Christian Houle,
“Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality
Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect
Democratization,” World Politics 61(October
2009): 589–622; John R. Freeman and Dennis P.
Quinn, “The Economic Origins of Democracy
Reconsidered,” American Political Science Review 106
(February 2012): 58–80.
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conditional on measures of globalization.
Yet, their preferred specification does
not include time effects to account for
common trending factors, an omission
which Acemoglu et. al. (2009) showed is
highly significant in this context, given
that democracy tends to trend at the
world level. Their paper also uses software
to interpolate missing inequality data, a
procedure that tends to artificially lower
the standard errors of their estimations,
which also pushes them towards finding
significant effects. The omission of time
effects is a common feature of papers that
claim to find significant effects of measures
on inequality on measures of democracy.7
We believe therefore that the basic though
unfortunately largely unpublished findings
of the Acemoglu, et. al. (2008, 2009)
project, that there is no robust causal
relationship between inequality and regime
transition, remain substantially unaltered.
This analysis still leaves open one interesting
empirical question latent in Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000, 2001) and indeed
in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Does
democratization tend to reduce inequality?
A seminal paper by Rodrik (1999) claimed
that it did and that the share of wages in
national income was systematically higher
in democracies. But a prior question would
be: does democratization have in reality
the type of impact on public policy that
it does in these models? One much cited
paper, by Gil, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(2004) claimed in fact that there was no
significant relationship between measures
of democracy, such as the Polity score, and
public policy variables such as the size of
government tax revenues relative to GDP,
or the amount of social spending relative
to GDP. Yet their paper used averaged
data to examine the pure cross-sectional
relationships in the data. This setup creates
severe concerns both about measurement
error (from the averaging) and omitted
7.For example Ben Ansell and David Samuels,
“Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian
Approach,” Comparative Political Studies 43(December
2010): 1543–74.

variable bias. In particular, their procedure
meant that they could not examine
the more interesting ‘within variation’
through examining whether or not when
a country democratized, or the reverse,
public policies moved in specific directions.

armed actors, violence, lobbying, and
other means of capturing the party
system) in order to continue to control the
political process. If so, we would not see
an impact of democratization on public
policy, redistribution and inequality.

In Acemoglu et al. (2013) we examine the
impact of democratization on public policies
and inequality using the most appealing
econometric model - a cross-national
panel data with country fixed effects and
time effects.8 Our study uses a theoretical
framework that recognizes that the simple
predictions of Meltzer and Richard (1981)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001),
that democratization decreases inequality
may be influenced by mechanisms this
research did not consider. This happens
for some of the same reasons we discussed
above when we argued that the impact
of inequality on democratization is
likely more complex than the initial
models allowed for, but in addition
we make several specific arguments.

2. Directors Law. Consistent with
Stigler’s ‘Director’s Law’ (1970),
democracy may transfer political power
to the middle class rather than the
poor. If so, redistribution may increase
and inequality may be curtailed only
if the middle class is in favor of such
redistribution. For example, Aidt et
al.(2009) showed that local franchise
expansion in 19th century Britain
from elites to the middle class often
reduced expenditure on local public
goods since the middle class bore the
brunt of property taxes that financed
them. In their model an expansion of
voting rights from the elite, by reducing
public good provision and taxes on the
middle class, can increase inequality.9

1. Captured Democracy. Even though
democracy
clearly
changes
the
distribution of de jure power in society
(as argued, for instance, in Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006), policy outcomes and
inequality depend not just on the de jure
but also on the de facto distribution of
power. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)
argue that, under certain circumstances,
those who see their de jure power eroded
by democratization may sufficiently
increase their investments in de facto
power (e.g., via control of local law
enforcement, mobilization of non-state

3.
Inequality-Increasing
Market
Opportunities. Autocracy may exclude
a large fraction of the population from
productive occupations (e.g., skilled
occupations) and entrepreneurship
(including lucrative contracts), as
Apartheid South Africa or the former
Soviet Union did both internally
and in Eastern Europe after 1945.
To the extent that there is significant
heterogeneity within this population,
the freedom to take part in economic
activities on a more level playing field
with the previous elite may actually
increase inequality within the excluded
or repressed group and the entire society.
It may also lead changes in public policy

8. Allan M. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A
Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal
of Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927;
Dani Rodrik, “Democracies Pay Higher Wages,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999): 707-738;
Ricard Gil, Casey B. Mulligan, and Xavier Sala-iMartin (2004) “Do Democracies Have Different
Public Policies than Nondemocracies?” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 18 (Winter 2004): 51-74;
Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo,
and James A. Robinson, “Democracy, Inequality and
Public Policy,” forthcoming in Anthony B. Atkinson
and François Bourguignon, eds., The Handbook of
Income Distribution (Amsterdam, North-Holland,
2013).
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9. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson,
“Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions,”
American Economic Review 98 (March 2008): 267293; George J. Stigler, “Director’s Law of Public
Income Redistribution,” Journal of Law and Economics
13 (April 1970): 1-10; Toke S. Aidt, Martin J.
Daunton, and Jaysri Dutta, “The Retrenchment
Hypothesis and the Extension of the Franchise
in England and Wales,” The Economic Journal 120
(September 2010): 990-1020.
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Figure 1. Change in taxes as a percentage of GDP between 1975 and 2000,
against the change in the Freedom House democracy index in the same
period.

to diverge from those predicted by the
simple models of democratization.
In the paper we develop a new consistent
definition of democratization based on
Freedom House and Polity indices, building
on the work by Papaioannou and
Siourounis (2008).10 One of the problems
of the raw indices is the significant
measurement error, which creates spurious
movements in democracy when none
exists in reality. We attempt to minimize
the influence of such measurement error
by using the information from both the
Freedom House and Polity datasets and
focusing only on democratization (and
reversals) that are not fully reversed
within a year. This leads to a 0-1 measure
of democracy for 170 countries annually
from 1960 to 2010. We also pay special
attention to modeling the dynamics of our
outcomes of interest, taxes as a percentage
of GDP and various measures of inequality.

government revenues as a percentage of
GDP). The long-run effect of democracy,
in our preferred specification, is about
a 5% point increase in tax revenues as a
fraction of GDP. These patterns are robust
to a variety of different estimates and
controls for immediate determinants of
democracy such as social unrest, war, and
the stock of education, yet there may still
exist unobserved determinants of changes

in democracy that also affect policy and
redistribution. To get a feel for these results,
Figure 1 plots the change in the
raw Freedom House score between 1975
and 2000 (since this is clearer than our 0-1
measure of democracy) against the change
in tax revenues as a percentage of GDP on
the vertical axis. This figure is useful since
it represents a simple way of looking at the
‘within variation’ (at least in the absence of
any covariates). The figure shows that there
is a clearly visible positive slope indicating
the estimated relationship consistent with
the hypothesis that as countries become
democratic, they expand their tax revenues.
Figure 2 presents an ‘event-study’ picture
which shows the dynamics of taxation
around democracy. Here we take the last
democratization event of each country and
average them. This figure is conditional
on the lagged dependent variable, country
fixed effects and time effect. It shows the
dynamics of tax revenues as a percentage of
GDP around the democratization, which we
normalize so that its pre-democracy average
is zero. This clearly shows that there is a
sustained positive increase in tax revenues
after a democratization whose magnitude

Figure 2. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP around a democratization.

Our empirical investigation uncovers
a number of interesting patterns. First,
we find a robust and quantitatively large
effect of democracy on tax revenues as
a percentage of GDP (and also on total
10. Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis,
“Democratisation and Growth,” The Economic
Journal 118 (October 2008): 1520-1551.
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Figure 3. Change in the Gini coefficient for net income between 1975 and
2000, against the change in the Freedom House democracy index in the
same period.

increases over time (eventually reaching
5%). By 15 years after a democratization
the standard error bands exclude zero.
Second, however, and contrary to Rodrik
(1999), we find no robust effect of
democracy on any measure of inequality.
Even though some selected specifications
do show a small, marginally significant
effect, these are not robust. This may reflect
the poorer quality of inequality data. But we
also suspect it may be related to the more
complex theoretical relationships between
democracy and inequality pointed out above.
The absence of a relationship between the
changes in democracy (Freedom House)
and the change in the Gini coefficient
1975-200 is evident from Figure 3. Figure
4 is an analogous event-study figure. It
shows that after a democratization there
does seem to be a fall in inequality but it is
not statistically distinguishable from zero.

he averaged the data, and second, that he
used an old version of the World Bank
data on wages. If instead of averaging the

data we use every five years, the standard
approach with a dynamic panel, his main
finding disappears. It also disappears even
with his own specification when we use
the more complete and updated version
of the data on wages (which he did not
have available at the time he wrote).
Third, we find an effect of democracy
on secondary schooling investments and
the extent of structural transformation
(e.g., an impact on the non-agricultural
share
of
employment
and
the
non-agricultural
share
of
output).
How could it be that democracy leads
to higher taxes and more education and
possibly structural change but has no impact
on inequality? This is an issue that requires a
great deal more research than in Acemoglu
et al. (2013), but all three of the above
mechanisms could be at play. The fact that
policy clearly changes after democratization
seems less consistent with ideas about
captured democracy, though it could be
that while elites cannot stop taxation, they
can manipulate how it is spent. The findings
do seem more consistent with Director’s
Law and Stigler’s claim that democracy

Figure 4. Gini coefficient for net income around a democratization.

Revisiting Rodrik’s findings we show
that while his results do still hold with
our measure of democracy (significant at
the 7% level), they are driven by several
important things. First of all, the fact that
19
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favors the middle class and therefore does
not generate the type of pro-poor or promedian voter policies hypothesized by the
early theoretical work. It could also be
the case that inequality increasing market
opportunities are at work with taxation
and redistribution taking place but their
effect on inequality being swamped.

Daron Acemoglu is Elizabeth and James
Killian Professor of Economics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Suresh
Naidu is assistant professor of economics
and public affairs at Columbia University.
Pascual Restrepo is a research assistant at the
Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia.
James Robinson is David Florence Professor
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for Quantitative Social Science and the
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
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than 7,000 observations. This accounts
for nearly all countries during the period
under study, and the dataset is (basically)
complete. Once I use different measures
of inequality, account for endogeneity
and impute missing observations my
hypothesis is supported empirically:
inequality reduces the likelihood that
democracy endures but is unrelated to
the likelihood of democratization itself.
THEORY
In this note, I will focus on two theories
about how inequality – more precisely,
interclass inequality – affects regime
changes. Both rest on a redistributive
approach, meaning that the effect of
inequality is driven by its effect on
preferences over redistribution among
different social classes. First, Boix, among
others, argues that inequality harms both
democratization and consolidation. The
intuition is that when inequality increases,
the ruling elite is less likely to concede
democracy, because it fears redistribution
under democracy. Similarly, the elite is more
likely to stage coups in unequal democracies,
because it wants to prevent redistribution.
Second, Acemoglu and Robinson agree that
inequality harms consolidation but argue
that inequality relates to democratization
through an inverted U-shaped relationship.
In equal autocracies, the population does
not demand democracy because it has
little to gain in terms of redistribution. At
intermediate levels of inequality, however,
the population has incentives to demand
democracy. At the same time, the ruling
elites are unwilling to use repression, because
redistribution is relatively cheap; and so
they democratize. But when inequality is
high, the elites opt for repression, because
the cost of redistribution is too high.
I argue that inequality harms consolidation
but has no effect on democratization. There
procedures.

are at least three reasons why inequality
is unlikely to have a substantial effect on
democratization through the mechanisms
described by previous redistributive
theories. First, these mechanisms rest
on the assumption that democratization
follows a single path, in which democracy
is initially demanded by the population but
eventually conceded by the ruling elite, i.e.
it is driven from below. However, in reality,
democratization is often driven from above,
for example through intra-elite competition.
There is thus a large group of transitions
for which these theories do not apply.
Second, even for transitions from below,
their predictions are unlikely to hold.
Contrary to what most scholars have
claimed, inequality actually has two
opposite, potentially offsetting, effects
on democratization. On the one hand,
inequality makes democracy more costly
for the elites by increasing redistribution.
On the other hand, inequality increases
the demand for regime change from the
population by increasing potential gains
from redistribution or expropriation.
The overall effect is thus ambiguous.
Acemoglu and Robinson do account
for both effects. However, their findings
depend on specific assumptions about the
discontinuity of the effect of inequality
on the cost of maintaining an autocracy.3
Third, the population faces a collective
action problem when mobilizing to
replace an autocracy by a democracy,
since democracy is a public good. Existing
theories expect inequality to affect
democratization by determining the
likelihood of the population rising against
the regime. But, if the masses are unable
to mobilize, the elites have no incentive
3. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003);
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006). See Houle,
“Inequality and Democracy,” for more detail on the
assumptions made in Acemoglu and Robinson.
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to respond to changes in inequality by
adopting democracy. Even if inequality were
to affect the likelihood of democratization,
its effect should be weak. I thus expect
inequality to bear little relationship
to the probability of democratization.
Do arguments linking inequality to
consolidation suffer from the same
problems as those linking inequality to
democratization? No.Transitions away from
democracy differ in at least two fundamental
ways from transitions to democracy. First,
they involve different groups of actors.
While democratizations may be initiated
by the elite or the masses, democratic
breakdowns are almost always caused by
the elite or the military, not the masses.
Second, and most importantly, transitions
to and away from democracies involve
different processes. On the one hand,
democratization from below is an
interactive process between the elite and
the masses, in which the former respond
to the demands of the latter. On the other
hand, democratic breakdown is a unilateral
process, in which one group (usually the
elite or the military) directly seizes power
without necessarily having the approval of
other groups. In the words of Acemoglu
and Robinson, “the move from democracy
to dictatorship is almost never consensual.”4
The asymmetry between the two
transition processes has key implications
for the relationship between inequality
and consolidation. First of all, since
most democratic breakdowns follow
a single path in which the military/
elite unilaterally seize power, theories
trying to explain them – contrary to
those concerned with democratization
– can be applied to almost all cases.
4. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 225.
The masses can be involved during transitions away
from democracy, notably by responding negatively (or
positively) to coups. However, their consentment is
not necessary for a democratic breakdown to occur.
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In addition, whereas inequality has two
opposite effects on democratization, it
only has a negative effect on consolidation.
The two effects of inequality on
democratization are caused by the fact that
democracy is demanded by the population
but, in the end, conceded by the elite. By
contrast, democratic breakdowns result
from the direct seizure of power by the
elite. Because the agreement of the masses
is not required, the effect of inequality on
its willingness to concede dictatorship
has little impact. Inequality mainly affects
democratic breakdowns by increasing
the cost of redistribution to the elite.
Therefore, one should expect that when
inequality increases the elite are more
likely to wage coups against democracies.
Finally, collective action problems do not
significantly reduce the capacity of the
elite to mobilize, since the elite form a
much smaller group than the population.
Moreover, installing a new authoritarian
regime provides specific benefits to those
that take part in the coup. Contrary to
transitions to democracy, transitions away
from democracy do not pose a severe
collective action problem for the group
initiating the process. Therefore, I expect
inequality to have a strong negative
effect on the survival of democracies.
DATA
The unit of analysis is the country-year.
The main dataset contains more than 7,000
observations and covers 183 countries
between 1960 and 2008. To determine
whether a country is democratic or
autocratic, I use the regime type dataset of
Cheibub et al., which extends the dataset
of Przeworski et al until 2006. I use two
main measures of inequality. First, I use
the capital share of the value added in
production. This gives the proportion of
the value created within specific firms than
accrues to the owners of these specific firms,
as opposed to the laborers. Low capital
shares indicate low levels of inequality.
The capital share is thus a measure of

interclass inequality, and is conceptually
similar to the surplus-value of Karl Marx.
I use an extension of the capital share
dataset assembled by Ortega and Rodriguez
that I presented in Houle.5 I imputed the
missing values for nearly all countries.
For each missing observation, twenty-five
values are predicted. This enables me to
account for the level of uncertainty of each
imputed observation during the estimation
process. Three types of evidence are used
to impute missing observations: previous
inequality levels of the same country; levels
of inequality of neighboring countries
during the same year; and other indicators
of inequality for the same country-year
(e.g., Gini coefficients). The intuition for
using the inequality level of neighbors is
that the level of inequality of a country
depends mostly on its factor endowments.
Because countries that are neighbors are
likely to share similar factor endowments
they also have similar levels of inequality.
Moreover, neighbors are likely to share
similar colonial experiences or to have been
affected by the same historical events (e.g.,
the establishment of communist regimes
in Eastern Europe).6 Most countries that
remain missing after the multiple imputation
are Islands (mostly Pacific Islands).
The second measure of inequality used is the
income Gini coefficients of the Estimation
of the Household Inequality and Inequity
(EHII) constructed by the University
of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP).
The dataset includes more than 3,500
observations on 147 countries between
1963 and 2002. I use the same control
5. Jose A. Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James R.
Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,”
Public Choice 143 (April 2010): 67-101; Przeworski
et al., Democracy and Development; Daniel Ortega and
Francisco Rodriguez. “Are Capital Shares Higher in
Poor Countries? Evidence from Industrial Surveys,”
Unpublished (Corporación Andina de Fomento
(CAF) and IESA, and Wesleyan University, 2006);
Houle, “Does Inequality Harm.”
6. See Houle, “Does Inequality Harm,” for more
detail.
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variables as in my previous work: GDP
per capita, growth, an oil exporter dummy
variable, the proportion of the population
that is Muslim, Protestant or Catholic,
ethnic and religious fractionalization,
the number of past transitions, a dummy
variable for countries that did not exist
prior to 1946, a dummy for former
British colonies, and the proportion of
countries worldwide that are democracies.7
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
I test the relationship between inequality
and democracy using dynamic probit
models. These models estimate the
probability of countries with a certain
regime (in the current period) transiting
to a new regime in the next period. One
advantage with this estimation technique is
that it enables us to distinguish between the
effect of inequality on democratization and
on consolidation. Column 1 of Table 1 tests
the hypothesis of a negative monotonic
relationship, advanced notably by Boix, using
capital shares. It shows that higher capital
shares are actually associated with larger
probability of democratization, though the
relationship is not statistically significant.
Table 1: Dynamic Probit Estimations of
the Effect of Inequality on the Probability
of Transitions to and away from Democracy
Model 2 of Table 1 estimates the nonlinear model of Acemoglu and Robinson
by adding capital share squared. The
predictions of Acemoglu and Robinson,
according to which the relationship is
inverted U-shaped, would be supported if
the coefficient on capital share is positive and
the one on capital share squared negative.8
As shown in model 2, both coefficients turn
out to have the opposite sign, although
7. University of Texas Inequality Project, Estimated
Household Income Inequality (EHII) Dataset,
Available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html;
Houle, “Inequality and Democracy.” Control variables
are taken from Przeworski et al., Democracy and
Development, and Cheibub et al., “Democracy and
Dictatorship.”
8. Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and
Robinson, Economic Origins.
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Table 1: Dynamic Probit Estimations of the Effect of Inequality on the Probability of
Transitions to and away from Democracy
Transition to Democracy

Cap. Shares

(1)

(2)

.009
(.006)

Cap. Shares sq.

(3)

Transition to Autocracy

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-.062

.04

.018

.102

(.05)

(.032)

(.008)**

(.014)***

.0005
(.0004)

Gini

-.007

.102

.06

(.015)

(.1)

(.02)***

Gini sq.

-.001
(.001)

GDP pc

Growth

Oil

Muslim

Protestant

Catholic

Ethnic fract.

Religious fract.

# Past Break.

New Country

Former British

.004

.015

.023

.019

-.165

-.492

-.464

-.066

(.06)

(.06)

(.095)

(.093)

(.115)

(.107)***

(.189)**

(.279)

-.01

-.01

-.015

-.016

-.017

-.02

-.037

-.01

(.004)***

(.004)***

(.006)***

(.006)***

(.007)***

(.008)**

(.013)***

(.012)

-.5

-.539

-.675

-.659

-.145

.126

.112

-.402

(.25)**

(.242)**

(.384)*

(.369)*

(.425)

(.313)

(.407)

(.358)

-.002

-.002

-.005

-.005

-.002

-.0009

-.005

-.003

(.002)

(.002)

(.005)

(.005)

(.004)

(.003)

(.004)

(.004)

.0006

.0005

-.003

-.004

.01

-.0007

-.0009

.015

(.003)

(.004)

(.006)

(.006)

(.009)

(.004)

(.006)

(.008)*

.002

.002

-.001

-.001

-.006

-.003

-.001

-.001

(.002)

(.002)

(.005)

(.005)

(.005)

(.003)

(.005)

(.004)

-.0006

-.0003

-.002

-.002

-.003

-.004

-.009

.005

(.002)

(.002)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.004)

(.005)*

(.007)

.002

.002

.007

.006

.013

-.001

-.004

.02

(.003)

(.003)

(.006)

(.006)

(.009)

(.004)

(.007)

(.011)*

.277

.276

.258

.257

.046

.178

.142

-.145

(.053)***

(.054)***

(.106)**

(.104)**

(.154)

(.065)***

(.099)

(.118)

-.151

-.127

-.198

-.218

-.405

.167

.293

.666

(.136)

(.138)

(.215)

(.207)

(.229)*

(.2)

(.307)

(.504)

-.058

-.061

-.022

-.02

-.042

-.687

-1.185

-.09

(.132)

(.131)

(.189)

(.188)

(.186)

(.246)***

(.371)***

(.354)
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both are statistically insignificant. A Wald
test demonstrates that the two coefficients
also fail to reach joint significance.
Columns 3 and 4 redo models 1 and 2
but with the Gini coefficients instead of
capital shares. Results are unchanged.
One potential problem with the analysis
presented thus far is that it does not
account for endogeneity, particularly
reverse causation. In fact, in inequality
theories of democratization, inequality
affects regime transition precisely because
it affects the incentives of different social
classes to control redistributive policies, and
thus change the inequality level. Moreover,
country-specific factors could affect both the
likelihood of regime change and inequality;
hence creating omitted variable bias.
Column 5 reproduces model 1 but using
an instrumental variable approach. It uses
the level of inequality of neighboring
countries as an instrument for the domestic
level of inequality. As I argued in Houle,
inequality tends to be clustered across
neighbors, notably because they share
factor endowments. Basic tests show that
the inequality level of neighbors is indeed
a strong instrument for domestic inequality
levels (F-statistic of 17.84). Since Houle
uses the inequality level of neighbors to
impute missing values, I only use the nonimputed capital shares in the estimation
reported in column 5 (and column 8).

It is possible that inequality in neighboring
states affect the regimes of neighbors, which
in turn influences the domestic political
regime. If that were the case, the instruments
would not be exogenous. Therefore, in order
to account for this potential mechanism I
control for the proportion of neighbors that
are democratic instead of controlling for
the proportion of democracies worldwide
as in the previous regressions. Results,
reported in column 5, are unchanged.
Column 6 estimates the effect of inequality
on the likelihood that a democracy breaks
down and transitions to autocracy. Positive
coefficients signify that the associated
independent variables increase the
probability of backsliding to dictatorship.
As expected, inequality increases the
likelihood that a democracy breaks
down and the relationship is statistically
significant at the five percent level.9
As shown in model 7, these results
are unchanged when inequality is
instead measured with Gini indexes.
Column 8 uses the same instrumental
9. See Houle, “Does Inequality Harm,” regarding
column 5. The results are unchanged when imputed
capital shares are also included. Regressions
using instrumental variables are run separately
for democratization and consolidation, which
explains the lower number of observations (e.g.,
only autocracies are included in column 5). This is
done in order to limit the number of instruments
needed and does not affect the validity of the results.
The results presented in column 6 are robust to the
use of only non-imputed observations (see Houle,
“Inequality and Democracy”). Moreover, the results
are unchanged when the regressions only cover the
period from 1960 to 2000.
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variable strategy as in model 5. Once
again, results suggest that inequality
harms the consolidation of democracy.
CONCLUSION
This note has argued that inequality does
not affect democratization but harms
consolidation of democracies. These
results suggest that the factors that affect
the establishment of democracies may be
very different from those that affect their
consolidation. In fact, the empirical analysis
presented above finds that many factors
other than inequality also seem to affect
these two transition processes differently.
Of course, this idea is not completely
new. Already, O’Donnell and Schmitter,
among others, argued that “political and
social processes are neither symmetric
nor reversible. What brings down a
democracy is not the inverse of those
factors that bring down an authoritarian
regime.”10 However, such insights have yet
to be fully integrated in the empirical and
theoretical literatures on regime changes.
Christian Houle is assistant professor of
political science at Michigan State University.

10. Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C.
Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
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Juan Linz Obituary

L inz O bituary , continued
(continued from page 3)

Lazarsfeld, Robert Lynd, and Kingsley
Davis. Linz formed an especially close
relationship with Seymour Martin Lipset,
under whose supervision he would write
a nine-hundred-plus page dissertation
consisting of a systematic dissection of The
Social Bases of West German Politics. Even
before officially finishing the dissertation,
Linz would also compile a “propositional
inventory” and co-author with Lipset a
two-volume manuscript The Social Bases of
Political Diversity in Western Democracies in
his capacity as Lipset’s research assistant. It
was never published but widely recognized
by Lipset and others, as a main source for
Lipset’s own seminal work, Political Man.
A grant from the SSRC’s Committee
in Comparative Politics allowed Linz to
return to Spain in the Spring of 1958 to
carry out field research for a study of the
Franco regime, an experience which led to
the publication of Linz’s first classic article,
“An Authoritarian Regime: The Case
of Spain.” Throughout his career, Spain
would command his attention as a crucial
case in comparative perspective. Linz did
more than any other Spanish scholar of his
generation to put his country at the very
center of international debates in the social
sciences, especially those in comparative
politics about regime types, breakdowns,
and transitions, as well as nationalism, all
the while challenging prevalent stereotypes
and “terrible simplifications.” In the process,
he directed and conducted a plethora of
pioneering survey research.
Linz was an enthusiastic and influential
participant in a host of professional
social scientific associations. He was a
founding member of the International
Sociological Association’s Committee of
Political Sociology (CPS), alongside Lipset,
Raymond Aron, Shmuel Esienstadt, and
Stein Rokkan, among others. He served
as President of the CPS (1971-79), as
President of the Council for European

Studies (1973-1974), President of the
World Association of Public Opinion
Research (1974-1976), and was a member
of the Executive Committee of the ISA
(1974-1982) as well as its Scientific
Committee (1974-1978). He was also
active in the International Political Science
Association and the American Political
Science Association, and served for many
years on the Scientific Committee for the
Center for Advanced Social Studies at the
Instituto Juan March in Madrid.
When he died, Linz was Sterling Professor
Emeritus of Political and Social Sciences
at Yale. He was much decorated, having
received many of his profession’s most
coveted prizes. He was elected member of
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
in 1976. He was awarded honorary doctoral
degrees from five universities; the University
of Granada (1976), Georgetown University
(1987), the Autonomous University of
Madrid (1992), the Phillips-Universität of
Marburg (1992), the University of Oslo
(2000), and the University of the Basque
Country (2002)]. In 1987, he was the
recipient of Spain’s most prestigious Premio
Príncipe de Asturias; and in 1996, he won
the University of Uppsala’s Johan Skytte
Prize, perhaps the closest thing in Political
Science to a Nobel Prize.
From the start of his career through the
very end of his life, Linz was a devoted
and beloved teacher. He supervised 65
dissertations on 31 different countries
spanning the entire globe. Several of
his students were political scientists and
sociologists who would soon become
eminent in their fields, such as Richard
Hamilton, Kenneth Erickson, Arturo
Valenzuela, Ezra Suleiman, Jan Gross, John
Stephens, Robert Fishman, Houchang
Chehabi, and Miguel Centeno. The authors
of this obituary both have the honor to
count ourselves among this “Linzian” family.
Alfred Stepan had the good fortune to first
25

come across Linz early in his own graduate
career at Columbia and to have the immense
intellectual and personal reward of working
as a co-author with Linz for thirty-five years
on books and articles. Jeff Miley was Linz’
second to last PhD and asked to help in the
selection, translation, and introductions to
the sections of the seven volumes of Linz’s
selected works.
Linz’s impact as a teacher stretched well
beyond his official students; those who
considered themselves such numbered
many, many more. He and his wife Rocío
de Terán were famous among students
for their extreme generosity in terms of
time and attention, and especially for the
hospitality with which the couple opened
the doors and spare bedroom, of their home
in Hamden, Connecticut to so many.
Two excellent sources on Linz’s thought and
writings are his sixty page interview with
Richard Snyder in Munch and Snyder’s,
Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative
Politics, and the 50 page intellectual
biography, done with Linz’s collaboration,
by José Ramón Montero and Jeff Miley in
their just published seven volume selected
works of Linz, published in Spanish as Juan
J. Linz. Obras Escogidas by the Centro de
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales in
Madrid.
Linz was an irreplaceable mentor and a
close friend to innumerable senior and
junior scholars throughout the world. He
will be sorely missed, and will certainly not
be forgotten.
Alfred Stepan, Columbia University and Jeff
Miley, Cambridge University
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S ection N ews
2014 APSA Annual Meeting: Chris
Reenock (Florida State University), our
section’s program chair for the 2014 annual
meeting, will soon begin reviewing all the
paper and panel proposals submitted by the
December 15 deadline. We look forward to
learning of his decisions next spring, and to
seeing many of you at the 2014 meeting in
Washington, DC.

outcomes that objectively make them
materially worse off. Specifically, she focuses
on three major puzzles in political science
and comparative politics:

Comparative Democratization Section
Welcomes New Officers: Jan Teorell
became the section’s new president and
Monika Nalepa the new treasurer at the
section’s business meeting in Chicago. Many
thanks to Steph Haggard and Amaney
Jamal for serving as president and treasurer
(respectively) for the last two years!

Second, why do citizens sometimes vote for
redistribution schemes that are in conflict
with their material interests?

Comparative Democratization Section
Award Winners:
Juan Linz Dissertation Award: Gwyneth
H. McClendon (Yale University) for her
dissertation “The Politics of Envy and
Esteem in Two Democracies.”

Dr. McClendon argues that individuals care
about more than simply maximizing their
material well-being. Specifically, they care
deeply about their relative status vis-à-vis
others within their same or similar group
(for example, neighbors or co-ethnics).
Envy, spite, and the desire for esteem can be
powerful motivations for behavior. Highwithin groups status has distinct value, and in
certain contexts, citizens will pursue it, even
at the expense of their material interests.

This year’s award committee included
Allen Hicken (University of Michigan)
(chair), Daniel Gingerich (University of
Virginia), and Nic Cheeseman (Oxford
University).
Committee Remarks on the Award
Winners:
“This year the committee for Juan Linz
Dissertation Award consisted of Nic
Cheeseman, Daniel Gingerich, and
Allen Hicken. We received and reviewed
a substantial number of outstanding
dissertations, many of which are worthy of
recognition. However, the committee agreed
that this year the Linz Award should go to
Gwyneth H. McClendon for her dissertation
“The Politics of Envy and Esteem in Two
Democracies.”
Dr. McClendon’s dissertation draws
on insights from social psychology and
behavioral economics to explain why, under
certain circumstances, individuals prefer

First, why do democracies sometimes fail to
meet the needs of their citizens, even when
there are Pareto-improving opportunities
that states could readily pursue?

Finally, why do certain citizens choose to
participate in protests and other forms of
political collective action when they could
free-ride?

The dissertation takes great care to define,
both intuitively and formally, what is meant
by within-group status concerns, and to
distinguish this concept (theoretically and
empirically) from similar concepts, such
as relative deprivation, status anxiety, and
last-place aversion. It builds a theory of
how within group-status concerns might
influence political behavior. Specifically,
certain contextual triggers (for example,
high levels of within-group inequality)
raise the salience of within-group status
concerns. Within group status concerns can,
depending on the context, encourage greater
participation, or lead citizens to favor a
“leveling down” of assets and incomes within
neighborhoods and among group members.
Dr. McClendon evaluates her argument by
26

drawing on data from both the U.S. and
South Africa.
In South Africa she is able to show that where
social status concerns have been triggered
citizens are more likely to oppose Pareto
improving provision of low-income housing,
and as a result, such housing is undersupplied
while resources for constructing low-income
housing go unused.
Drawing on attitudinal and demographic
survey data from both countries, she
demonstrates that, consistent with her theory,
social status concerns shape respondents’
attitudes towards redistribution. In South
Africa, where inequality among neighboring
co-ethnics has dramatically increased the
correlation between within-group status and
support for distribution is large and negative.
In the U.S. case, where status concerns are
salient the degree to which the median voter
is economically distant from rich group
members while also close to poor group
members correlates with the median voter’s
support for anti-redistribution policies.
Finally, using a field experiment she finds
evidence that the promise of in-group
esteem induced higher rates of attendance at
a rally for gay marriage in New Jersey.
In short, the committee agreed that Dr.
McClendon’s dissertation represents some
of the best work being done in comparative
politics. It combines novel theorizing with
the clever and effective use of multiple
empirical strategies. This work is sure to
help reshape how we think about citizen
preferences over public policy and political
participation.”
Best Book Award: Milan Svolik (University
of Illinois) was award the best book award for
The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge
University Press).
This year’s award committee included
David Samuels (University of Minnesota)
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(chair), Rachel Beatty Riedl (Northwestern
University), James Melton (University
College London).
Committee Remarks on the Award
Winner:
“Political science has witnessed a proliferation
of scholarship on authoritarian regimes
over the past 10-15 years. Rather than
simply categorizing all non-democracies as
totalitarian, where the dictator is supreme
leader with unquestionable control over the
elites and masses, we have come to appreciate
the heterogeneity between dictatorships and
to understand that even a dictator’s power
depends on a coalition of supporters. The
literature upon which these realizations
are based has greatly expanded both our
knowledge and interest in authoritarian
politics. Missing from the extant literature,
though, is a theory that unifies and enhances
all that we have learned; a theory that lays
the groundwork for future scholarship on
the politics of authoritarian rule.
Svolik’s book provides such a theory. He
argues that dictators face two dilemmas:
1) authoritarian power-sharing and 2)
authoritarian control. The former is about
managing their relationship with the ruling
elite, and the latter is about managing their
relationship with the masses. In explaining
these problems and the solutions used
by dictators to address them, Svolik’s
work engulfs much of the literature on
authoritarian rule. He addresses how best
to conceptualize authoritarian regimes, why
some dictatorships are more durable than
others, why we sometimes dictators are able
to personalize their rule, and how dictators
use political institutions, parties and
repression to prolong their rule. These topics
are addressed with both rigorous (formal)
theory and innovative empirical methods,
which sometimes utilizes data collected
specifically for this book. Ultimately, though,
the most important contribution of this
book is the dynamic theoretical framework it
establishes for understanding authoritarian

rule. This is a framework that will be built
upon for years to come by scholars who seek
to identify alternative ways in which dictators
address the dilemmas of authoritarian
power-sharing and authoritarian control
first identified by Svolik.”
Michael Coppedge (University of Notre
Dame) was awarded an honorable mention
for Democratization and Research Methods
(Cambridge University Press).
Committee Remarks on the Honorable
Mention:
“This book provides a critical overview
of the evolution of the scholarly study
of regime change, with a focus on the
interplay between different theories and
different methodologies, highlighting the
epistemological challenges that scholars
- both qualitative and quantitative - face
when attempting to make sense of this
complex phenomenon. In addition to
providing a most robust and yet precise
conceptualization, Coppedge does more
than merely summarize the democratization
literature. By putting the question of regime
transition in dialogue with methodologies
he adjudicates between the theoretical and
empirical evaluations of democracy’s causes.
In doing so, he has provided a public good
that will be an invaluable resource for all
students of democratization, and will surely
be assigned in most graduate seminars (and
upper-division undergraduate courses) for
years to come.”
Best Article Award: Robert Woodberry
(National University of Singapore) won the
best article award for his American Political
Science Review piece, “The Missionary Roots
of Liberal Democracy.”
This year’s award committee included
Milan Svolik (University of Illinois) (Chair),
Svend-Erik Skaaning (Aarhus University),
and Leonardo R. Arriola (University of
California, Berkeley).
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Committee Remarks on the Award
Winner:
“The committee unanimously decided
to award the best article prize to Robert
Woodberry for his article “The Missionary
Roots of Liberal Democracy”. In this article,
which came out in the May 2012 issue
of the American Political Science Review,
Woodberry argues that conversionary
Protestants were a crucial catalyst that
initiated the spread of the civic liberties and
associations that ultimately resulted in the
emergence of liberal democracy.
A brief version of Woodberry’s theoretical
argument goes as follows: conversionary
Protestants wanted ordinary people to be i)
able to read the Bible and ii) actively involved
in their church. Yet in their attempts to
spread their faith, conversionary Protestants
were in effect facilitating the spread of mass
education, mass printing, and civil society.
These byproducts of religious activism in
turn led to the emergence of actors and
conditions favorable to democracy: civic
associations, political parties, religious
liberties, and mass political participation.
Hence, according to Woodberry, democracy
was not the autonomous triumph of modern
forms of political organization and activity
– like political parties, labor movements,
and mass education. Rather, these modern
political actors were the byproduct of a
very traditional activity, namely, religious
conversion and competition.
These arguments alone amount to an
important and novel challenge to the
standard versions of the modernization
theory. Yet, Woodberry’s article is also
exceptional in the way it combines historical
and statistical research in order to evaluate
this theoretical proposition.
First, Woodberry shows that there is a
strong association between Protestantism
and democracy across a number of historical
and geographical contexts: in Western
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Europe, in settler colonies, in Eastern
Europe after the fall of communism, and in
the rest of the contemporary world. Then he
presents historical evidence of conversionary
protestants’ involvement in the spread of
mass printing, mass education, civil society,
and the rule of law – and thus highlights the
specific mechanisms by which conversionary
protestants fostered conditions favorable to
the emergence of democracy. And finally,
using original data on Protestant missionary
involvement around the world, Professor
Woodberry demonstrates that the historic
prevalence of Protestant missionaries
explains about half the variation in
democracy outside of Europe – even after
controlling for most standard covariates
and after accounting for endogeneity by an
instrumental variable analysis.
To summarize, it is the combination of
a new approach to a classic, important
question and the nuanced use of different
kinds of methods and evidence when
evaluating his theoretical claims that led
us to award this year’s best article prize to
Robert Woodberry.”
Best Fieldwork Award: Adam Auerbach
won the best fieldwork prize for his
dissertation project, “Cooperation in
Uncertainty: Migration, Ethnicity, and
Community Governance in India’s Urban
Slums.”
This year’s award committee included
Leonard
Wantchekon
(Princeton
University) (chair), Oeindrila Dube (New
York University), Gwyneth McClendon
(Yale University).
Committee Remarks on the Award
Winners “This year’s committee is pleased to
have selected Adam Auerbach’s dissertation
project, “Cooperation in Uncertainty:
Migration, Ethnicity, and Community
Governance in India’s Urban Slums,” for
the Comparative Democratization’s Best
Fieldwork Prize. Auerbach’s dissertation

project identifies a compelling research
question -- namely, what explains variation
in the degree of development and level
of public goods provision across slums in
India? To answer it, Auerbach has employed
a mixed-methods approach that has
involved extensive ethnographic fieldwork
over 15 months, a host of interviews
with political leaders, gang members, and
squatter settlement residents, the collection
of about 3,000 documents from community
meetings, election campaigns and leadership
correspondence, an original survey of just
under two thousand households across
80 slums, a database of party workers
characteristics, and the creation of satelliteimaging maps. His fieldwork efforts are
impressive in their sheer breadth, depth,
and creativity. He has collected rich data
on often-overlooked communities and
political activities. His innovative approach
has also thus far led to intriguing and
novel results. For instance, Auerbach finds,
contrary to much extant research, that
ethnic heterogeneity can have a positive
impact on public goods provision, at least
when it leads to competitive and dense
patronage networks. His dissertation project
promises to make a key contribution to
political science literatures on economic
development, ethnic diversity, public goods
provision, clientelism, political competition,
and research design.”
Sarah Parkinson was also awarded an
honorable mention for her work on
“Reinventing the Resistance: Order and
Violence among Palestinians in Lebanon.”
Committee Remarks on the Honorable
Mention: “The committee is also pleased
to award Sarah Parkinson’s dissertation,
“Reinventing the Resistance: Order and
Violence Among Palestinians in Lebanon,”
an Honorable Mention. Parkinson went
above and beyond the depth and personal
risk typically undertaken for dissertation
fieldwork and with striking results. She
spent over 19 months, over the course of 5
28

years, living in and near refugee camps in
Lebanon in order to make sense of variation
in the reorganization of Palestinian militant
organizations in the decades since 1980. Her
central question -- what explains the different
ways in which militant organizations recover
and reorganize after defeat? -- advances
literatures on war, on organizational theory
and change, and on social networks. Under
difficult and dangerous circumstances,
Parkinson won and kept the trust of her
research subjects. She integrated herself
fully into daily life and collected impressive
archival and oral history data from both
women and male officers. The committee
believes that the depth, integrity, and careful
design of her project will make a very
important contribution to political science.”
Best Paper Award: Kunle Owolabi
(Villanova) won the best paper award for
his work on “Literacy and Democracy After
Slavery?”
This year’s award committee included
Zachary Elkins (University of Texas
at Austin) (Chair), Daniel Ziblatt
(Harvard University), and Joseph Wright
(Pennsylvania State University).
Committee Remarks on the Award
Winner:
“We—the selection committee—agreed
unanimously in our decision. We found
Owolabi’s paper to be a highly original
treatment of a fascinating research question.
Owolabi notes a puzzling difference in
literacy rates between two sets of countries
characterized two different patterns of
colonization: those in which colonizers
imported non-indigenous laborers to
colonies (largely in the Americas) and those
in which colonizers dominated indigenous
populations (largely in Africa and Asia).
Paradoxically, those societies characterized
by forced settlement (the first mode) exhbit
much higher literacy rates in the postcolonial era than do those characterized by
occupation (the second mode).
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Owolabi’s explanation for this paradox is
compelling. He suggests that the process
associated with the abolition of slavery in
colonies of forced settlement led to some
surprising benefits with respect to citizenship
and education. By contrast, societies of
occupation maintained strict administrative
codes for indigenous populations that
essentially denied them fundamental
citizenship rights until the post-World War
II era. This deprivation in membership and
status in the community had a remarkable
impact on educational outcomes. Owolabi
tests his theory convincingly with a careful
statistical analysis. The result is a highly
intriguing historical paper, which we expect
will be published in the next several years in
a top journal.
We congratulate Kunle Owolabi heartily
and wish him the best of luck in his future
work in this area.”
Autocracies of the World Dataset Now
Available:
On October 18, 2013, Beatriz Magaloni,
Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min at Stanford
University released the first edition of
the Autocracies of the World (AoW)
1950-2012 dataset. Among a variety of
attributes, the data tracks regime types for
all countries from 1950-2012 with more
specific sub-categories (monarchy, single
party, hegemonic, military) for all autocratic
country-years. Building on top of extant
regime classification datasets, the AoW
offers at least three unique contributions:
removing all hybrid classifications;
correcting classification errors and omissions
in other datasets; and including two new
measurements of personalist rule that apply
to all autocratic governments. Further details
on these changes and other useful covariates
(such as regime duration) can be found in
the dataset’s codebook. Both the data and
codebook will soon be housed by Stanford’s
Center on Democracy, Development, and
Rule of Law (CDDRL). Both resources are
also currently available for free download at
http://ericmin.com/aow-data.

NEWS FROM MEMBERS
Naazneen Barma, assistant professor
of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, has been awarded
a grant from the 2013 Minerva Research
Initiative, along with co-PIs Jessica Piombo
and Naomi Levy. The research project
is entitled “Public Service Provision as
Peace-building: How Do Autonomous
Efforts Compare to Internationally Aided
Interventions?” and comprises comparative
case study work in Cambodia, Laos, and
Uganda on the relationship between peacebuilding and state-building.
Michael Bernhard,
Raymond
and
Miriam Ehrlich Chair in Political Science,
University of Florida, and Ruchan Kaya
published “Are Elections Mechanisms of
Authoritarian Stability or Democratization?
Evidence from Postcommunist Eurasia” in
the September 2013 Perspectives on Politics,
in which the authors test whether elections
have functioned as a mechanism of change
or of neo-authoritarian stability in the
postcommunist world. Bernhard’s coedited
book (with Jan Kubik), Twenty Years after
Communism: The Politics of Memory and
Commemoration, is under contract with
Oxford University Press and is expected to
be published in October 2014.
Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of
Politics, Oxford University, published the
chapter on “Communism” in Michael
Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc
Stears (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political
Ideologies in 2013. Brown’s own more recent
book, The Rise and Fall of Communism (Ecco,
2011), has been translated in nine different
countries, most recently Israel and Russia.
Matt Buehler, alumnus of the University
of Texas-Austin (2013), will begin a
tenure track position at the University of
Tennessee’s Department of Political Science
in Fall 2014. This year, he is participating
in a post-doctoral fellowship at the Center
for International and Regional Studies at
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign
29

Service in Qatar to work on his book
manuscript that examines the success and
failure of alliances between Islamists and
leftists in Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania.
Maxwell Cameron, director of the Centre
for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
University of British Columbia, published
Strong
Constitutions:
Social-Cognitive
Origins of the Separation of Powers (Oxford
University Press, 2013). The book is the first
social scientific theory of the separation
of powers based on language and social
cognition. Visit http://strongconstitutions.
com for more information.
Paul J. Carnegie, senior lecturer in political
science, Universiti Brunei Darussalam,
published “Can an Indonesian Model Work
in the Middle East?” in the Summer 2013
Middle East Quarterly. Recognizing that
earlier concerns over an Islamist ascendancy
after the fall of Indonesian President
Suharto proved largely unfounded, Carnegie
asks how this development was possible in
the world’s most populous Muslim country
and asks if it can serve as a template for the
ongoing transitions in the Middle East.
Carnegie was recently in Pontianak in West
Kalimantan, Indonesia in late June, where he
was conducting field research on the politics
of decentralization reform in the country’s
provinces.
Dinissa S. Duvanova, assistant professor
of political science, University of Buffalo,
SUNY, published Building Business in
Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe,
and Eurasia: Collective Goods, Selective
Incentives, and Predatory States (Cambridge
University Press), in which the author shows
that postcommunist business associations
function as substitutes for state and private
mechanisms for good governance. Please
write to the author at duvanova@buffalo.
edu for a discount code if you would like to
purchase the book.
Todd Eisenstadt, professor of government,
American University, and Karleen West of
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West Virginia University have received a
three-year grant from the National Science
Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences
Division for their work on “Collaborative
Research: Identifying the Conditions
Under Which Indigenous Communities
Engage in Legal Mobilization.” Using a
survey conducted with Ecuadorian partners,
Eisenstadt and West are studying poor,
rural, indigenous communities in that
country - and in a comparative framework
- to understand how they overcome
socioeconomic and geographic barriers to
launch new forms of social movements
relying on Western science and international
collaboration.
Bonnie N. Field, associate professor,
Bentley University and visiting scholar at
Harvard’s Center for European Studies,
published “Resolute Leaders and ‘Cardboard
Deputies’: Parliamentary Party Unity in the
New Spanish Democracy” in the September
2013 South European Society and Politics,
which puts forward a leadership-centered
explanation of parliamentary party unity in
new democracies. She also published Politics
and Society in Contemporary Spain: From
Zapatero to Rajoy (Palgrave 2013), co-edited
with Alfonso Botti (University of Modena
and Reggio Emilia). The book offers a
comprehensive and nuanced analysis of
contemporary Spain. Focusing on the second
term of Socialist Prime Minister José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero, the dramatic defeat
of the Socialists in the 2011 elections and
the alternation of power to the conservative
Popular Party, it underscores Spain’s deep
economic and political crisis.
Julie Fisher Melton published Importing
Democracy: The Role of NGOs in South
Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina. Published
by the Kettering Foundation in 2013,
the book examines the roles of NGOs in
democratization by conducting hundreds
of interviews in several countries across the
world.

Erica Frantz, assistant professor of political
science, Bridgewater State University, and
Natasha Ezrow published Failed States
and Institutional Decay: Understanding
Instability and Poverty in the Developing
World (Bloomsbury Publishing), in which
the author explains how and why different
types of institutions deteriorate and
illustrates the impact that institutional decay
has on political instability and poverty using
examples from all over the world.
Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political
science and sociology, European University
at St. Petersburg, published (in Russian)
Lz ognya da v polymya: Rossiiskaya Politika
Posle SSSR (Out of the Frying Pan, into the
Fire: Russian Politics after the USSR), which
analyzes why more than two decades after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian
politics has not brought the country closer
to political freedom. Gel’man’s article,
“Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to Electoral
Authoritarianism in Russia” appears in
the March-April 2013 Problems of PostCommunism.
Agustina Giraudy, assistant professor
at American University’s School of
International Service, published “Varieties
of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes:
Evidence from Argentina and Mexico” in
the March 2013 Studies in Comparative
International Development. Recognizing the
shortcomings of subnational undemocratic
regimes literature, the author calls for
a separation between two orthogonal
dimensions: the access to and the exercise of
state power.
Henry Hale, associate professor of political
science and international affairs, The George
Washington University, Nikolay Petrov, and
Maria Lipman published “Three Dilemmas
of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia
from Putin to Putin” in the September 2013
Post-Soviet Affairs. The authors investigate
how hybrid regimes supply governance by
examining a series of dilemmas (involving
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elections, the mass media, and state
institutions) that their rulers face. A copy of
the article is available by request by writing
to hhale@gwu.edu.
Debra Javeline, associate professor of
political science, University of Notre Dame,
Jessica J. Hellmann, Rodrigo Castro Cornejo,
and Gregory Shufeldt, published “Expert
Opinion on Climate Change and Threats to
Biodiversity” in the August 2013 Bioscience.
The authors suggest policymakers consult
environmental biologists on emerging and
controversial issues such as climate change
and use transparent, standardized metrics of
expertise when deciding which scientists to
consult.
Harshan Kumarasingham, senior research
fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, University of London, recently
published several articles: “Constrained
Parliamentarism in the New Zealand
Regime” (with John Power), which appeared
in the April 2013 Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics; “Exporting Executive
Accountability: Westminster Legacies
of Executive Power” in the July 2013
Parliamentary Affairs; and “‘The Jewel of
the East yet Has Its Flaws: The Deceptive
Tranquility Surrounding Sri Lankan
Independence,” published by the Heidelberg
Papers in South Asian and Comparative
Politics’ Working Papers series in June 2013.
Todd Landman, executive dean, faculty
of social sciences, University of Essex,
published Human Rights and Democracy: The
Precarious Triumph of Ideals (Bloomsbury
Academic Press), in which the author
traces how state and non-state actors have
created social, political, and legal institutions
that seek to constrain the worst forms of
human behavior and embraced the ideas of
democracy and human rights in new ways.
Staffan I. Lindberg, association professor
of political science at the University of
Gothenburg and the University of Florida,
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published “Mapping Accountability: Core
Concept and Subtypes” in the June 2013
International Review of Administrative
Sciences and “Have the Cake and Eat It: The
Rational Voter in Africa” in a forthcoming
issue of Party Politics. Lindberg and Keith
Weghorst also published “What Drives
the Swing Voter in Africa?” in the July
2013 American Journal of Political Science.
Finally, Lindberg, Pontus Strimling, Micael
Ehn, Kimmo Eriksson, and Bo Rothstein
published “Can Efficient Institutions Induce
Cooperation Among Low Trust Agents?
An Experimental Approach” as part of the
Quality of Government Institute’s Working
Paper series.
James Melton, Lecturer in Comparative
Politics, University College London,
Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of
International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf
Research Scholar and Professor of Political
Science, University of Chicago, and Zachary
Elkins, associate professor of government,
University of Texas at Austin, have launched
a new website, Constitute, which uses
data from the Comparative Constitutions
Projects to allow national constitutions to be
served by topic. Constitute can be accessed
at www.constituteproject.org/#/.
Yonatan Morse has taken an appointment
as visiting assistant professor and associate
director of the Center for Democracy and
Civil Society at Georgetown University’s
department of government. Morse also
published “Party Matters: The Institutional
Origins of Competitiveness and Hegemony
in Post Cold War Tanzania,” which
will appear in an upcoming issue of
Democratization.
Leila Piran, adjunct professor at George
Washington University’s School of
Professional Studies, published Institutional
Change in Turkey: The Impact of EU Reforms
on Human Rights and Policing (Palgrave
MacMillan). The book explores the domestic
reasons behind police reform in Turkey in

the aftermath of the 1980 military coup
and argues that, while important, the EU’s
influence on democracy and human rights
only began to influence police reform after
1999.
Sebastian Royo, associate dean of the
College of Arts and Sciences at Suffolk
University, recently published Lessons from
the Economic Crisis in Spain (Palgrave);
“Portugal in the European Union: The Limits
of Convergence” in a special issue of South
European Society and Politics that focused
on “Europeanisation and the Southern
Periphery”; and a book chapter entitled
“A ‘Ship in Trouble’ The Spanish Banking
System in the Midst of the Global Financial
System Crisis: The Limits of Regulation” to
the book Market-Based Banking, Varieties of
Financial Capitalism and the Financial Crisis,
edited by Iain Hardie and David Howarth
and published by Oxford University Press.
Sanjay Ruparelia, assistant professor of
politics, New School for Social Research, was
recently awarded a Postdoctoral Fellowship
for Transregional Research to conduct
fieldwork for his new project, “Demanding
a Right to Basic Social Welfare: Contesting
the Law in India and China,” by the Social
Science Research Council. Ruparelia also
published “India’s New Rights Agenda:
Genesis, Promises, Risks” in the September
2013 Pacific Affairs.
Ben Ross Schneider, Ford International
Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts
Institute
of Technology, published
Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America,
in which the author argues that Latin
America has a distinctive, enduring form
of hierarchical capitalism characterized
by multinational corporations, diversified
business groups, low skills, and segmented
labor markets.
Holli A. Semetko, Asa Griggs Candler
Professor of Media and International
Affairs and Professor of Political Science,
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Emory University, was named a Fulbright
Nehru Scholar to India for 2013-14. She is
based at IIT Bombay for the fall semester.
Her research on strategic communication
in India focuses on business, government,
and international affairs. The Sage Handbook
of Political Communication, edited by Holli
Semetko and Margaret Scammell, was
published in 2012.
Dan Slater, associate professor of political
science, University of Chicago, published a
coauthored article in the September 2013
Perspectives on Politics with Joseph Wong,
professor of political science, University of
Toronto, entitled “The Strength to Concede:
Ruling Parties and Democratization in
Developmental Asia.”
Lahra Smith, assistant professor, Edmund
A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University, published Making
Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender, and
National Identity in Ethiopia (Cambridge
University Press). Using data from Ethiopia
and developing a historically informed and
empirically nuanced study of language policy
and ethnicity and gender identities, the book
analyzes the contestation over citizenship
that engages the state, social movements,
and individuals in substantive ways.
Etel Solingen was recently appointed as the
Thomas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in
Peace Studies at the University of California
Irvine. Solingen also served as the president
of the International Studies Association
from 2012 to 2013 under the theme “The
Politics of Transnational and Regional
Diffusion,” highlighting a large number of
panels on comparative democratization, the
Arab Spring, and related topics. She also
published “Three Scenes of Sovereignty and
Power” in Martha Finnemore and Judith
Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: Rethinking
Power in the Contemporary World (Oxford
University Press).
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A book written by Guillermo Trejo,
associate professor of political science,
University of Notre Dame, entitled
Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion,
Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action
in Mexico (Cambridge University Press),
received an honorary mention for the
2013 Charles Tilly Award for Best Book
Published in Collective Behavior and Social
Movements from the American Sociological
Association (ASA).
Maya Tudor, university lecturer in
government and public policy, Oxford
University, published The Promise of Power:
The Social Origins of Democracy in India and
Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge University
Press), in which she suggests that the
emergence of a stable democracy in India
and an unstable autocracy in Pakistan is
best explained by the historically-specific
interests of the dominant social group which
led each independence movement as well
as by the varying strength of the political
parties which were created to pursue those
interests. Tudor also published The Historical
Inheritance of India’s Democracy (Routledge
Handbook on Indian Politics).
Rollin F. Tusalem was recently promoted
to associate professor of political science
at Arkansas State University. He recently
published “Bringing the Military Back In:
The Politicisation of the Military and its
Effects on Democratic Consolidation” and
“The Impact of Diamonds on Economic
Growth, Adverse Regime Change, and
Democratic State Building in Africa” (with
Minion K.C. Morrison) in upcoming issues
of International Political Science Review
and “The Effect of Political Dynasties
on Effective Democratic Governance:
Evidence from the Philippines” (with Jeffrey
Pe-Aguirre) in Asian Politics and Policy.

Rachel Vanderhill, visiting assistant
professor of international relations,
Wheaton College, and Michael E. Aleprete,
Jr. edited International Dimensions of
Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from
Post-Soviet States (Lexington Books). The
edited volume explores how international
factors interact with domestic conditions to
explain the persistence of authoritarianism
throughout the region. The selections in the
volume cover several countries, including
Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan,
South Ossetia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus,
and the Russian Federation. The failure
of democratic consolidation among postSoviet states offers important lessons for
policymakers and academics dealing with
the recent wave of political transitions in the
Middle East and Asia.
Michael Wahman (formerly University
of Texas at Austin) started a new position
as Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow at London
School of Economic’s Department of
Government on September 1. Wahman’s
research is supported by a two-year grant
from the Swedish Research Council.
During his time at LSE, he will concentrate
on a project studying African sub-national
variation in election manipulation and
electoral behavior.
Shannon Drysdale Walsh was awarded a
National Endowment for the Humanities
Summer Stipend for 2013 to support two
months of full-time writing and research
on her book project Engendering State
Institutions: State Response to Violence
Against Women in Latin America. This book
manuscript proposes a theoretical framework
to explain variation in the construction and
performance of specialized state institutions
that address violence against women.
Drysdale Walsh compares Guatemala,
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Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and
Honduras, countries that have relatively
few resources and little political will to
implement legal norms that aim to prevent
and sanction violence against women. In
part, she argues that transnational advocacy
networks help overcome state resistance to
advancing institutional specialization and
performance by providing external pressure
and international funding to support new
institution-strengthening efforts within the
justice system.
Kurt Weyland, Lozano Long Professor of
Latin American Politics, University of Texas
at Austin, won the Mary Parker Follett
Prize of the APSA Politics and History
section for two of his articles: “Diffusion
Waves and European Democratization: The
Impact of Organizational Development”
and “The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising
Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of
1848?” Weyland also published “The Threat
from the Populist Left” in the June 2013
Journal of Democracy’s cluster of articles on
“Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift.”
Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor
of political science, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, and Rebecca WeitzShapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant
Professor of Political Science, Brown
University, published “Lacking Information
or Condoning Corruption: When Do
Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?’ in the
July 2013 Comparative Politics. Using an
original survey experiment, the article finds
little evidence of Brazilian voters accepting
a tradeoff in which they support corrupt
politicians who are otherwise providing
public goods; instead, when voters are given
information about political corruption,
they express a preference for removing the
politician from office.
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The October 2013 (Vol. 24, no. 4) Journal
of Democracy features a cluster of articles
on “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring,’” as well as
individual case studies on democracy and
the quality of the state, governance, Paraguay,
Malaysia, and elections in Africa.
“Democracy and the Quality of the State” by
Francis Fukuyama
What is the relationship between high-quality
state administration and democracy? A look back
at modern Greece and Italy, along with Germany
and the United States, provides some insights.
“Reflections on ‘Governance’” by Marc F.
Plattner
“Governance,” once merely a synonym for
government, has taken on new meanings that
tend to downplay the importance of the political.
But can “good governance” be achieved today
without the protections of liberal democracy?
Tracking the “Arab Spring”
I. “Why the Modest Harvest?” by Jason
Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew
Reynolds
Popular uprisings have occurred only in some
Arab states and in even fewer have authoritarian
rulers been overthrown. What factors allow us to
predict whether an authoritarian regime will be
vulnerable?
II. “Egypt’s Failed Transition” by Nathan J.
Brown
The July 2013 military takeover has squashed
democratic hopes in Egypt, at least for now. How
did things go so wrong, and what lessons are to be
drawn from this lamentable episode?
III. “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism”
by Steven Heydemann
The Assad regime has been adapting to the new
challenges posed by mass uprisings through a
process of “authoritarian learning,” and at least
some of its methods are being applied elsewhere in
the region.
IV. “Yemen Changes Everything…And
Nothing” by April Longley Alley
A long-ruling strongman president has been

unseated by popular unrest and a negotiated
transition is under way, but to many Yemenis this
all appears to be a change more of appearance than
of substance.
V. “Libya Starts from Scratch” by Mieczysław
P. Boduszyński and Duncan Pickard
Qadhafi is gone after subjecting his country to a
brutal dictatorship for more than four decades, but
the devastated institutional landscape that he left
behind bodes ill for Libya’s democratic prospects.
“The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers” by
Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning
Is democracy threatened by a “reverse wave”?
Examining regional patterns and distinguishing
between different types of democracy gives us a
new basis for assessing this question.
“Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment”
by Leiv Marsteintredet, Mariana Llanos, and
Detlef Nolte
The phenomenon of the “interrupted presidency”
remains a key source of democratic instability
in Latin America, as was demonstrated once
again by the 2012 impeachment of Paraguayan
president Fernando Lugo.
Research Report
“Assessing the Quality of Elections” by
Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran
Martinez i Coma
Determining whether an election has met
international standards is a pressing issue for
both practitioners and scholars. An important
new study aims to systematize the assessment of
electoral integrity.
“Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward” by
Bridget Welsh
Despite losing the popular vote, Malaysia’s longruling Barisan Nasional triumphed again in
the country’s 2013 elections, disappointing an
emboldened opposition that had high hopes after
a strong performance in 2008.
Exchange
I. “Reexamining African Elections” by
Matthijs Bogaards
Do even unfree and unfair elections in subSaharan Africa, if repeated often enough,
really contribute to democratization? A fresh
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look at the evidence casts doubt on the theory of
“democratization by elections.
II. “Confusing Categories, Shifting Targets” by
Staffan I. Lindberg
Staffan Lindberg replies to Matthijs Bogaards’s
critique, finding the latter’s methodology
problematic and arguing that the evidence
for association between repeated elections and
democratization remains strong.
The July 2013 (Volume 24, no. 3) issue of the
Journal of Democracy features clusters of articles
on “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift,”
“Putin versus Civil Society,” and “Kenya’s 2013
Elections,” as well individual case studies on
Jordan, Algeria, and Bahrain. The full text of
selected articles and the tables of contents of
all issues are available on the Journal’s website.
“The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes” by
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
Authoritarian regimes that have their origins in
revolutionary struggle have a much higher survival
rate than other brands of authoritarianism. What
accounts for their durability?
Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift
I. “The Threat from the Populist Left” by Kurt
Weyland
The left-populist authoritarianism that is taking
hold across a swatch of Latin America bears many
resemblances to the rightist populism that was
once widespread in the region. There are signs,
however, that the leftist variant will be an even
bigger problem for liberal democracy.
II. “Technocratic Populism in Ecuador” by
Carlos de la Torre
President Rafael Correa, now entering
his third term, has built a curious form of
populist-authoritarian regime. He champions
redistributionism and a kind of technocratic
leftism while assaulting the traditional left along
with such mainstays of a liberal society as the
freedom of the press.
III. “Chavismo After Chávez?” by Miriam
Kornblith
Can a regime built by and centered around a
populist strongman survive that strongman’s
death? A natural experiment is now unfolding in
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Venezuela as a resurgent opposition and a crisis of
governability converge on the would-be heirs of
Hugo Chávez.
Putin versus Civil Society
I. “The Long Struggle for Freedom” by Leon
Aron
Today’s Russian protest movement in many ways
resembles past civil-rights and civil-resistance
efforts in other parts of the world, from its
commitment to nonviolence to its key demands—a
vote that counts and equality under the law.
II. “Outlawing the Opposition” by Miriam
Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers
The Putin regime, having faced its first real
challenge in the form of mass protests after the
2011 Duma elections, is responding with a series
of laws intended to intimidate its civil-society
opposition, if not stamp it out altogether.
“Transforming the Arab World’s ProtectionRacket Politics” by Daniel Brumberg
The Arab world’s old autocracies survived by
manipulating the sharp identity conflicts in their
societies. The division and distrust that this style of
rule generated is now making it especially difficult
to carry out the kind of pact-making often crucial
to successful democratic transitions.
“Algeria versus the Arab Spring” by Frédéric
Volpi
Not only did the Algerian regime survive the
“Arab Spring,” it hardly deviated from its
normal methods of authoritarian governance—
patronage, pseudodemocratization, and effective
use of the security apparatus.
“Bahrain’s Decade of Discontent” by Frederic
Wehrey
When this small island kingdom in the Gulf
joined the wider Arab world’s political upheavals
in March 2011, it was a reaction to regional
events, but also a reflection of internal problems
that had been festering for a decade.
“Jordan: The Ruse of Reform” by Sean L. Yom
The Hashemite monarchy still fails to understand
the challenges that threaten Jordan’s political
order. The old playbook of limited, manipulated

reform is no longer enough, but key players fail to
realize it.
Kenya’s 2013 Elections
I. “Choosing Peace over Democracy” by James
D. Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Ferree,
and Clark Gibson
In March 2013, Kenyans took to the polls in
what turned out to be another disputed election.
Why did the peace hold this time, unlike in 2007,
and what are the implications for democracy in
Kenya?
II. “Technology Is Not Democracy” by Joel D.
Barkan
In an effort to avoid repeating the 2007 electoral
debacle, Kenya’s election commission turned to
technology, but its high-tech voter-registration
and vote-count processes fell short. Its experience
has important lessons both for emerging
democracies and for international donors.

“Ahab and the White Whale: the
Contemporary Debate around the Forms of
Catholic Political Commitment in Italy” by
Alberta Giorgi
“Religious Parties in Chile: the Christian
Democratic Party and the Independent
Democratic Union” by Juan Pablo Luna,
Felipe Monestier, and Fernando Rosenblatt
“Religion and Democratization in Northern
Ireland: Is Religion actually Ethnicity in
Disguise?” by Eoin O’Malley and Dawn Walsh
“Conclusion: Reassessing the Relation
between Religion, Political Actors, and
Democratization” by Luca Ozzano and
Francesco Cavatorta

The October 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 5)
Democratization is a special issue on “Religiously
Oriented Parties and Democratization.”

The August 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 4)
Democratization features articles on democracy
promotion in eastern Europe, elections in
Tanzania and Uganda, measuring democracy,
regime type and the impact of democracy
assistance, institutional factors and party
systems in new democracies, and the influence
of external actors on democratization.

“Introduction: Religiously Oriented Parties
and Democratization” by Luca Ozzano and
Francesco Cavatorta

“Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy:
the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood” by
Gwendolyn Sasse

“The Many Faces of the Political God: A
Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties” by
Luca Ozzano

“Elections and Landmark Policies in Tanzania
and Uganda” by Anne Mette Kjær and Ole
Therkildsen

“The Perils of Polarization and Religious
Parties: The Democratic Challenges of
Political Fragmentation in Israel and Turkey”
by Sultan Tepe

“Bringing Direct Democracy Back In: Toward
a Three-Dimensional Measure of Democracy”
by David Altman

Democratization

“Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey
of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist
to Conservative Party” by Francesco Cavatorta
and Fabio Merone
“Refining the Moderation Thesis. Two
Religious Parties and Indian Democracy: the
Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva
Radicalism and Coalition Politics” by
Christophe Jaffrelot
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“Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact
of Democracy Aid on Democracy?” by Agnes
Cornell
“Institutional Factors Affecting Party Systems
in New Democracies: Endogenous or
Exogenous Predictors?” by Mazen Hassan
“When One Might not See the Wood for the
Trees: the ‘Historical Turn’ in Democratization
Studies, Critical Junctures, and Cross-Case
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New Research
Comparisons” by Jørgen Møller
“When Can External Actors Influence
Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and
Gatekeeper Elites” by Jakob Tolstrup
“Inclusive Institutions and Stability of
Transition toward Democracy in Post-Civil
War States” by Madhav Joshi
“Remembering Violence: the Role of Apology
and Dialogue in Turkey’s Democratization
Process” by Mneesha Gellman
SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON
DEMOCRACY
This section features selected articles on
democracy that appeared in journals received
by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center,
June 1– June 1, 2013.
African Affairs, Vol. 111, no. 449, October
2013
“The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse:
Rebel–Military Integration and Conflict
Dynamics in the Eastern DRC” by Maria
Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen
“Resource Curse or Resource Disease? Oil in
Ghana” by Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus,
and Wojciech Tycholiz
“Continuity and Change in Senegalese Party
Politics: Lessons from the 2012 Elections” by
Danielle Resnick
African Affairs, Vol. 111, no. 448, July 2013
“The Roots of Resilience: Exploring Popular
Support for African Traditional Authorities”
by
Carolyn Logan
“Democratic Revolutionaries or Pocketbook
Protesters? The Roots of the 2009–2010
Uprisings in Niger” by Lisa Mueller
“From Warlords to Freedom Fighters: Political
Violence and State Formation in Umbumbulu,
South Africa” by Sarah M. Mathis

American Political Science Review, Vol. 107,
no. 3, August 2013
“Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking HighRisk Mobilization and Social Networks in
War” by Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson
“Quality of Government: Toward a More
Complex Definition” by Marcus Agnafors
“Quality Over Quantity: Amici Influence
and Judicial Decision Making” by Janet M.
Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, and
Matthew P. Hitt
“Empowering Women through Development
Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment
in Afghanistan” by Andrew Beath, Fotini
Christia, Ruben Enikolopov
“Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration?
Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi” by
Cyrus Samii
“The Semblance of Democratic Revolution:
Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution” by
Mark R. Beissinger
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.
46, no. 3, September 2013
“Continuity and Change in Russia’s Policy
toward Central and Eastern Europe” by Yury
E. Fedorov
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 10,
October 2013
“The Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics:
Evidence from Surveys and a Laboratory
Democracy” by Benjamin Barber IV, Pablo
Beramendi, and Erik Wibbels
“The Varying Political Toll of Concerns About
Corruption in Good Versus Bad Economic
Times” by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and
Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga
“Mainstream or Niche? Vote-Seeking
Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies
of Political Parties” by Thomas M. Meyer and
Markus Wagner
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“Violence Against Civilians in the Second
Intifada: The Moderating Effect of Armed
Group Structure on Opportunistic Violence”
by Devorah Manekin
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 9,
September 2013
“Vote Buying With Multiple Distributive
Goods” by Michael Albertus
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 8,
August 2013
“Competitiveness,
Partisanship,
and
Subnational Protest in Argentina” by Moisés
Arce and Jorge Mangonnet
“When Grapevine News Meets Mass Media:
Different Information Sources and Popular
Perceptions of Government Corruption in
Mainland China” by Jiangnan Zhu, Jie Lu, and
Tianjian Shi
“Attitude Variability Among Latin American
Publics: How Party System Structuration
Affects Left/Right Ideology” by Imke
Harbers, Catherine E. de Vries, and Marco R.
Steenbergen
“Campaign Spending in Proportional
Electoral Systems: Incumbents Versus
Challengers Revisited” by Joel W. Johnson
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 7,
July 2013
“Engendering’Politics: The Impact of
Descriptive Representation on Women’s
Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa”
by Tiffany D. Barnes and Stephanie M.
Burchard
“Catchall or Catch and Release? The Electoral
Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’
March to the Middle in Western Europe”
by Johannes Karreth, Jonathan T. Polk, and
Christopher S. Allen
“When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing
Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks
and Distributive Expectations in Argentina
and Chile” by Ernesto Calvo and Maria
Victoria Murillo
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“The Calculus of Consensus Democracy:
Rethinking Patterns of Democracy Without
Veto Players” by Anthony J. McGann and
Michael Latner
Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, no. 1, October
2013
“The Left and Minority Representation:
The Labour Party, Muslim Candidates, and
Inclusion Tradeoffs” by Rafaela Dancygier
“Striking Concessions from Governments:
The Success of General Strikes in Western
Europe, 1980–2009” by Kerstin Hamann,
Alison Johnston, and John Kelly
“Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and
Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program” by Natasha
Borges Sugiyama and Wendy Hunter
“Subnational Islamization through Secular
Parties: Comparing Shari’a Politics in Two
Indonesian Provinces” by Michael Buehler
Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, no. 4, July 2013
“Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy:
Evidence from Latin America” by Aníbal
Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring
“Electing Extremists? Party Primaries and
Legislative Candidates in Mexico” by Kathleen
Bruhn
“Lacking Information or Condoning
Corruption? When Will Voters Support
Corrupt Politicians?” by Matthew S. Winters
and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro
“Political Representation in Microstates: The
Cases of St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and
Palau” by Wouter Veenendaal
“Perspectives on the Power and Persistence
of States in Africa and Beyond” by Erin Hern
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 21, no. 3, Summer
2013
“Patterns of Electoral Contestation in Russian
Regional Assemblies: Between ‘Competitive’
and ‘Hegemonic’ Authoritarianism” by Petr
Panov and Cameron Ross

“Party System Institutionalization in Ukraine”
by Olena Rybiy
“The Negative Consequences of Proportional
Representation in Ukraine” by Serhij
Vasylchenko
East European Politics, Vol. 29, no. 2, May
2013
“State Functions and Media Politics: Case
Study on Print Media in Slovenia” by Nikolai
Genov
International Political Science Review, Vol.
34, no. 5, November 2013
“The Internet: A New Route to Good
Governance” by Susan Khazaeli and Daniel
Stockemer
“Why Do People Vote? Rationality or
Emotion” by Ching-Hsing Wang
“A Right-to-Left Policy Switch? An Analysis
of the Honduran Case under Manuel Zelaya”
by Clayton M. Cunha Filho, André Luiz
Coelho, and Fidel I. Pérez Flores
“Repression, Political Threats, and Survival
under Autocracy” by Abel Escribà-Folch
“Voting Differently across Electoral Arenas:
Empirical Implications from a Decentralized
Democracy” by Pedro Riera
International Political Science Review, Vol.
34, no. 4, September 2013
“Is Corruption an Enemy of Civil Society?
The Case of Central and Eastern Europe” by
Patty Zakaria
“Opening
Pandora’s
Box?
Inclusive
Institutions and the Onset of Internal Conflict
in Oil-Rich Countries” by Tim Wegenast
“Changing the Rules of the Game:
Determinants of Successful Electoral System
Change in Central and Eastern Europe” by
Philipp Harfst
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Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 51,
no. 3, September 2013
“Second Time Around: Ex-Combatants at the
Polls in Liberia” by Johanna Söderström
Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 3, Summer
2013
“Iran’s Basij: Membership in a Militant
Islamist Organization” by Afshon Ostovar
“University under Siege: The Case of the
Professors’ Basij Organization” by Saeid
Golkar
Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 2013
“Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from
Lebanon’s Taif Experience” by Stephan Rosiny
“Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic
Shifts?” by Beverley Milton-Edwards
“The Rise of Militant Salafism in Azerbaijan
and Its Regional Implications” by Emil
Souleimanov and Maya Ehrmann
“Turkey Today: Headscarves and Women’s
Rights” by Marvine Howe
Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 2, Summer
2013
“Order, Freedom and Chaos: Sovereignties in
Syria” by George Abu Ahmad
“Creating Democrats? Testing the Arab
Spring” by Ashley Barnes
“Transition in the Middle East: New Arab
Realities and Iran” by Mahmood Sariolghalam
Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 6, November 2013
“Analysing Multiparty Competition in
Plurality Rule Elections” by Patrick Dunleavy
and Rekha Diwakar
“Have the Cake and Eat It: The Rational
Voter in Africa” by Staffan I Lindberg
Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 5, September 2013
“Political Parties, Independents and the
Electoral Market in sub-Saharan Africa” by
John Ishiyama, Anna Batta, and Angela Sortor
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New Research
“Measuring Vertical Integration in Parties
with Multi-Level Systems Data” by Lori
Thorlakson
“Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic
Consolidation in Africa?” by Danielle Resnick
“Beyond Outbidding? Ethnic Party Strategies
in Serbia” by Christina Isabel Zuber
Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 4, July 2013
“The Fate of Intra-Party Democracy:
Leadership Autonomy and Activist Influence
in the Mass Party and the Cartel Party” by
Karl Loxbo
“The Politicization of Indigenous Identities in
Peru” by Christopher Raymond and Moisés
Arce
“How Things Fall Apart: Candidate Selection
and the Cohesion of Dominant Parties in
South Africa and Namibia” by Shane Mac
Giollabhuí
SELECTED
NEW
DEMOCRACY

BOOKS

ON

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES
The Adversary First Amendment: Free
Expression and the Foundations of American
Democracy. By Martin H. Redish. Stanford
University Press, 2013. 238 pp.
America’s
Right:
Anti-Establishment
Conservatism from Goldwater to the Tea Party.
By Robert B. Horwitz. Polity, 2013. 279 pp.
By-Elections in British Politics, 1832–1914.
Edited by T.G. Otte and Paul Readman.
Boydell, 2013. 306 pp.
Changing Minds, If Not Hearts: Political
Remedies for Racial Conflict. By James M.
Glaser and Timothy J. Ryan. University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 182 pp.
Congress: A Performance Appraisal. By
Andrew J. Taylor. Westview, 2013. 262 pp.
Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving.

By E. Scott Adler and John D. Wilkerson.
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 246 pp.
Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance,
and Radical Democratic Thought in the Early
American Republic. By Robert W.T. Martin.
New York University Press, 2013. 262 pp.
Immigration and the Border: Politics and Policy
in the Latino Century. Edited by David L.
Leal and José E. Limón. University of Notre
Dame Press, 2013. 488 pp.
Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece
and the Future of Europe. By Costas Douzinas.
Polity, 2013. 234 pp.
Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the
Failure of American Democracy. By Nolan
McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard
Rosenthal. Princeton University Press, 2013.
356 pp.
Politics of the American Dream: Democratic
Inclusion in Contemporary American Political
Culture. By Cyril Ghosh. Palgrave Macmillan,
2013. 240 pp.
The Substance of Representation: Congress,
American Political Development, and
Lawmaking. By John S. Lapinski. Princeton
University Press, 2013. 181 pp.
ASIA
Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and
Pakistan to the Brink and Back. By Bruce
Riedel. Brookings Institution, 2013. 230 pp.
Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework
from Ancient Times to the “New Reform Era.”
By Karla W. Simon. Oxford University Press,
2013. 502 pp.
Conceptions of Chinese Democracy: Reading
Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang
Ching-kuo. By David J. Lorenzo. Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2013. 257 pp.
Democracy and Islam in Indonesia. Edited by
Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan. Columbia
University Press, 2013. 252 pp.
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Helmsman Ruler: China’s Pragmatic Version of
Plato’s Ideal Political Succession System in The
Republic. By Keith K.C. Hui. Trafford, 2013.
159 pp.
Korean Political and Economic Development:
Crisis, Security, and Institutional Rebalancing.
By Jongryn Mo and Barry R. Weingast.
Harvard University Press, 2013. 218 pp.
The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in
China. By Joseph Fewsmith. Cambridge
University Press, 2013. 219 pp.
New Security Challenges in Asia. Edited by
Michael Wills and Robert M. Hathaway.
Woodrow Wilson Center, 2013. 273 pp.
Social Organizations and the Authoritarian
State in China. By Timothy Hildebrandt.
Cambridge University Press, 2013. 217 pp.
Transforming India: Challenges to the World’s
Largest Democracy. By Sumantra Bose.
Harvard University Press, 2013. 337 pp.
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION
Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan
Through Peace and War. Revised and Updated
Edition. By Thomas de Waal. New York
University Press, 2013. 387 pp.
Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On
Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. Edited
by Gábor Attila Tóth. Central European
University Press, 2012. 570 pp.
Critical Thinking in Slovakia After Socialism.
By Jonathan L. Larson. University of
Rochester Press, 2013. 240 pp.
Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of
Love with Vladimir Putin. By Ben Judah. Yale
University Press, 2013. 379 pp.
Postcommunism from Within: Social Justice,
Mobilization, and Hegemony. Edited by Jan
Kubik and Amy Linch. New York University
Press, 2013. 440 pp.
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New Research
Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the
Balkans between Nationalism and
Transnationalism. By Ina Merdjanova. Oxford
University Press, 2013. 198 pp.
Restless Valley: Revolution, Murder, and
Intrigue in the Heart of Central Asia. By
Philip Shishkin. Yale University Press, 2013.
316 pp.
LATIN
AMERICA
AND
THE
CARIBBEAN
Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and
the Politics of Death. By Deborah T. Levenson.
Duke University Press, 2013. 183 pp.
Constructing Democratic Governance in
Latin America. 4th Edition. Edited by Jorge
I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter. Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2013. 377 pp.
Decentralization and Popular Democracy:
Governance from Below in Bolivia. By JeanPaul Faguet. University of Michigan Press,
2012. 358 pp.
Democracy in Latin America: Between Hope
and Despair. By Ignacio Walker, translated
by Krystin Krause, Holly Bird, and Scott
Mainwaring. University of Notre Dame Press,
2013. 262 pp.
Democratic Governance in Latin America:
A Regional Discussion. Edited by MariaTeresa Nogales and Susan Zelaya-Fenner.
International Republican Institute, 2013. 124
pp.
Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin
America. By Stephen B. Kaplan. Cambridge
University Press, 2013. 331 pp.
Mexico’s Left: The Paradox of the PRD. By Dag
Mossige. Lynne Rienner, 2013. 337 pp.
Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social
Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule Since
the Late Nineteenth Century. By Gilbert M.
Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau. Duke University
Press, 2013. 252 pp.

Power and Regionalism in Latin America: The
Politics of Mercosur. By Laura Gómez-Mera.
University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. 286 pp.

The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in
the Middle East. By Charles Tripp. Cambridge
University Press, 2013. 385 pp.

Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism,
Democracy, and Indigenous Rights. By Patricia
Richards. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013.
261 pp.

The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution,
Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from
Tunis to Damascus. By Adeed Dawisha.
Norton, 2013. 288 pp.

Speculative Fictions: Chilean Culture,
Economics, and the Neoliberal Transition.
By Alessandro Fornazzari. University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2013. 158 pp.

Social Movements, Mobilization, and
Contestation in the Middle East and North
Africa. 2nd Edition. Edited by Joel Beinin
and Frédéric Vairel. Stanford University Press,
2013. 328 pp.

Sustaining Activism: A Brazilian Women’s
Movement
and
a
Father-Daughter
Collaboration. By Jeffrey W. Rubin and Emma
Sokoloff-Rubin. Duke University Press, 2013.
184 pp.
Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana: Race
and Politics in Two Plural Societies. By Ann
Marie Bissessar and John Gaffar La Guerre.
Lexington, 2013. 202 pp.
Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United
States, and the Road Ahead. By Shannon K.
O’Neil. Oxford University Press, 2013. 239 pp.
We Created Chávez: A People’s History of
the Venezuelan Revolution. By George
Ciccariello-Maher. Duke University Press,
2013. 320 pp.
MIDDLE EAST
Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and
the Arab Spring. By Philip N. Howard and
Muzammil M. Hussain. Oxford University
Press, 2013. 145 pp.
Identity and Nation in Iraq. By Sherko
Kirmanj. Lynne Rienner, 2013. 319 pp.
The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an
Islamist Movement. By Carrie Rosefsky
Wickham. Princeton University Press, 2013.
384 pp.
Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey.
By Ergun Özbudun. Lynne Rienner, 2013.
155 pp.
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Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. By Elliot
Abrams. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
339 pp.
COMPARATIVE,
THEORETICAL,
GENERAL
Accountability and Corruption: A Study into
Political Institutions as Referees Between
Principals and Agents. By Catharina Groop.
Åbo Akademi University Press, 2013. 344 pp.
Arts of the Political: New Openings for the
Left. By Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift. Duke
University Press, 2013. 239 pp.
Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace. By
Ronald J. Deibert. McClelland and Stewart,
2013. 312 pp.
Boundary
Control:
Subnational
Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. By
Edward L. Gibson. Cambridge University
Press, 2012. 192 pp.
Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear:
From Absolutism to Neo-Conservatism. By
Marc Mulholland. Oxford University Press,
2012. 400 pp.
Captured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption in
Law. By Laura S. Underkuffler. Yale University
Press, 2013. 334 pp.
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New Research
Celebrity Politics: Image and Identity in
Contemporary Political Communications. By
Mark Wheeler. Polity, 2013. 210 pp.

Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? By
Thomas G. Weiss. Polity, 2013. 225 pp.

Civil Society in the Age of Monitory Democracy.
Edited by Lars Trägårdh, Nina Witoszek, and
Bron Taylor. Berghahn, 2013. 350 pp.

Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing
When We Need It Most. By Thomas Hale,
David Held, and Kevin Young. Polity, 2013.
357 pp.

Climate Governance in the Developing World.
Edited by David Held, Charles Roger, and
Eva-Maria Nag. Polity, 2013. 284 pp.

Importing Democracy: The Role of NGOs in
South Africa, Tajikistan, & Argentina. By Julie
Fisher. Kettering Foundation, 2013. 394 pp.

The Communist Horizon. By Jodi Dean. Verso,
2012. 250 pp.

Is Democracy a Lost Cause? Paradoxes of an
Imperfect Invention. By Alfio Mastropaolo.
Translated by Clare Tame. ECPR Press, 2012.
265 pp.

Cruel Modernity. By Jean Franco. Duke
University Press, 2013. 326 pp.
Culture and Foreign Policy: The Neglected
Factor in International Relations. By Howard
J. Wiarda. Ashgate, 2013. 153 pp.
Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System
Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance. By
Amel Ahmed. Cambridge University Press,
2013. 228 pp.
Democratic Statecraft: Political Realism and
Popular Power. By J.S. Maloy. Cambridge
University Press, 2013. 236 pp.
Development Aid Confronts Politics: The
Almost Revolution. By Thomas Carothers and
Diane de Gramont. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2013. 347 pp.
The Dialectics of Citizenship: Exploring
Privilege, Exclusion, and Racialization. By
Bernd Reiter. Michigan State University
Press, 2013. 196 pp.

Masters of the Word: How Media Shaped
History from the Alphabet to the Internet. By
William J. Bernstein. Grove, 2013. 420 pp.
Military Engagement: Influencing Armed
Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic
Transitions, Volume 1, Overview and
Action Plan. By Dennis C. Blair. Brookings
Institution, 2013. 144 pp.
Military Engagement: Influencing Armed
Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic
Transitions, Volume 2, Regional and Country
Studies. Edited by Dennis C. Blair. Brookings
Institution, 2013. 392 pp.
Multilevel Citizenship. Edited by Willem
Maas. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
280 pp.
On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory
and Model of Democracy. By Philip Pettit.
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 338 pp.

Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and
Rights. By Arabella Lyon. Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2013. 222 pp.

Our Political Nature: The Evolutionary
Origins of What Divides Us. By Avi Tuschman.
Prometheus, 2013. 543 pp.

The Down-Deep Delight of Democracy. By
Mark Purcell. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 174 pp.

Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic
Lessons from Democratic Transitions. Edited
by Isobel Coleman and Terra Lawson-Remer.
Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 256 pp.

The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli
and the World That He Made. By Philip Bobbit.
Grove Press, 2013. 270 pp.
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Politics in the Age of Austerity. Edited by
Armin Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck. Polity,
2013. 320 pp.
The Politics of Nation-Building: Making CoNationals, Refugees, and Minorities. By Harris
Mylonas. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
255 pp.
Presidentialism: Power in Comparative
Perspective. By Michael L. Mezey. Lynne
Rienner, 2013. 260 pp.
Representation: Elections and Beyond. Edited
by Jack Nagel and Rogers M. Smith. University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 337 pp.
The Third Globalization: Can Wealthy Nations
Stay Rich in the Twenty-First Century?
Edited by Dan Breznitz and John Zysman.
Oxford University Press, 2013. 416 pp.
Tocqueville and the Frontiers of Democracy.
Edited by Ewa Atanassow and Richard Boyd.
Cambridge University Press, 2013. 375 pp.
Who Counts? The Power of Participatory
Statistics. Edited by Jeremy Holland. Practical
Action, 2013. 212 pp.
Why Ancient Greece? The Birth and
Development of Democracy. By Nicholas
Kyriazis. Psichogios, 2012. 127 pp.
Why Governments and Parties Manipulate
Elections: Theory, Practice and Implications. By
Alberto Simpser. Cambridge University Press,
2013. 282 pp.
Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O.
Hirschman. By Jeremy Adelman. Princeton
University Press, 2013. 740 pp.
Wrestling with Democracy: Voting Systems as
Politics in the Twentieth-Century West. By
Dennis Pilon. University of Toronto Press,
2013. 392 pp.
Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew
Brzezinski. Edited by Charles Gati. Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2013. 253 pp.
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